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ENTITLEMENTS TO SPOUSAL SUPPORT
AFTER DIVORCE

MARCIA O'KELLY*

I. INTRODUCTION
Section 14-05-24 of the North Dakota Century Code
authorizes a divorce court to compel one party "to make such
suitable allowances to the other party for support during life or for a
shorter period as to the court may seem just." 1 This Article will
examine evolving judicial perceptions of the suitability and justice
of court-imposed support obligations after divorce.
Before 1976, North Dakota courts understood the statutory
directive of section 14-05-24 to permit judicial enforcement of
alimony in the common-law sense of a continuation after divorce of
*Associate Professor, University of North Dakota School of Law; B.A., Northwestern, 1955;
J.D., University of North Dakota School of Law, 1971; LL.M., George Washington, 1980. For an
earlier version of this article, see O'Kelly, Three Concepts ofAlimony in North Dakota, I U.N.D. ScitoOt.
oF L,\W FCULTYJ. 69 (1982).
I. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-05-24 (1981). Section 14-05-24 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides as follows:
When a divorce is granted, the court shall make such equitable distribution of the real
and personal property of the parties as may seem just and proper, and may compel
either of the parties to provide for the maintenance of the children of the marriage, and
to make such suitable allowances to the other party for support during life or for a
shorter period as to the court may seem just, having regard to the circumstances of the
parties respectively. The court from time to time may modify its orders in these
respects.
Id.
The statutory description of post-marital alimony as permanent distinguishes it from temporary
or interim alimony authorized by 5 14-05-23 of the North Dakota Century Code for the period
(luring which the divorce action is pending or being appealed. Rudel v. Rudel, 279 N.W.2d 651, 657
(N.D. 1979). See N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-05-23 (1981). In much contemporary caselaw and literature,
however, alimony or maintenace is described as permanent in the sense of being of indefinite
duration, to distinguish it from awards for a specific duration. See, e.g., Seablom v. Scablom, 348
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the husband's marital duty to support his wife. 2 That concept of
alimony grew out of and reflected the common-law status of
married women as economically incapacitated and dependent..
In 1976, the North Dakota Supreme Court rejected the
common-law concept of alimony as a continuing duty of spousal
support. 3 Instead, it recognized a contemporary doctrine of
temporary maintenance to rehabilitate a person disadvantaged by
divorce.
While continuing to emphasize the functional definition of
most post-marital support as rehabilitative, 5 the court since 1976
has also recognized an additional or alternative entitlement to
permanent post-marital maintenance in circumstances that limit or
preclude rehabilitation. 6 The additional or alternative purpose of
permanent maintenance is compensatory: it is sometimes
appropriate for spousal support to function as a means of sharing
marital assets that cannot be fairly reallocated by a division of
property at the time of divorce. Furthermore, because spousal
support is modifiable, it may under some circumstances be a
necessary mechanism for compensating or sharing future
contingent interests. This new understanding of spousal
maintenance as a compensatory entitlement is grounded in the
contemporary perception of the economic value of spouses' various
roles within marriages.
II. THE RUFF-FISCHER GUIDELINES
The North Dakota Supreme Court routinely recites a list of
factors that must be considered by trial courts in determining both
property distribution and spousal support: the ages of the parties,
N.W.2d 920, 924 (N.D. 1984) (the purposes of spousal support are rehabilitation or permanent
maintenance).
The North Dakota Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed its preference for the term "spousal
support" rather than alimony. See, e.g., Coulter v. Coulter, 328 N.W.2d 232, 241 (N.D. 1982);
Urlaub v. Urlaub, 325 N.W.2d 234, 238 (N.D. 1982). In Lipp v. Lipp, the court stated that "the
term 'alimony' in North Dakota statutes and caselaw is used in a generic sense and means any
payment to be made to the other spouse for any purpose, including payment as a part of a property
division, spousal support, or child support or a combination of any of them." Lipp v. Lipp, 355
N.W.2d 817, 820 (N.D. 1984). The court prefers the term "spousal support" because it is more
descriptive and is less likely to cause confusion between awards of maintenance and property
divisions. Coulter, 328 N.W.2d at 241.
2. See, e.g., Nugent v. Nugent, 152 N.W.2d 323, 327 (N.D. 1967).
3. Bingert v. Bingert, 247 N.W.2d 464, 468-69 (N.D. 1976).
4. Id. at 469.
5. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 326 N.W.2d 697, 700 (N.D. 1982); Jondahl v. Jondahl, 344 N.W.2d
63, 72 (N.D. 1984); Delorey v. Delorey, 357 N.W.2d 488, 490 (N.D. 1984).
6. See Delorey v. Delorey, 357 N.W.2d 488, 490 (N.D. 1984); Lipp v. Lipp, 355 N.W.2d 817,
820 (N.D. 1984); Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904, 911 (N.D. 1984); Scablom v. Seablom, 348
N.W.2d 920, 924 (N.D. 1984). When monthly payments do not effectuate a purpose such as
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their earning ability, their conduct during the marriage, the
duration of the marriage, their station in life, their health and
physical condition, their necessaries and circumstances, financial
and otherwise, the value and income-producing capacity of their
property and whether it was accumulated before or after marriage,
the efforts and attitudes of the parties towards its accumulation,
and other such matters or facts as may be material. These
considerations have come to be labeled Fischer or Ruff-Fischer
guidelines. 7
Spousal support and property distribution determinations are
findings of fact and are not set aside on appeal unless they are
clearly erroneous.8 Since an appellate court cannot decide whether
such determinations are clearly erroneous unless it understands the
trial court's determination of net worth and rationale for fiscal
allocations, the North Dakota Supreme Court will remand for
further proceedings if it lacks sufficient information to
understanding the determinations. 9
Inclusion of a particular factor as a Ruff-Fischer guideline
amounts to judicial designation of its permissible relevance.
Beyond that, trial courts are left to select and to weigh those factors
that they can treat as determinative in particular cases. 1 0 A trial

rehabilitation or maintenance, the court suggests that they might constitute a property division. See
Lipp v. Lipp, 355 N.W.2d at 821-22 (court not required to decide whether payments constituted
spousal support or a property division since, even if support, they are not modifiable because there
was no material change in circumstances).
7. The guidelines entered North Dakota law in Ruff v. Ruff, where they were quoted with
approval from a Nebraska case. Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 784, 52 N.W.2d 107, 111 (1952)
(quoting Holmes v. Holmes, 152 Neb. 556, 41 N.W.2d 919 (1950)). The phrase "and other such
matters as may be material" was added in Fischer v. Fischer, 139 N.W.2d 845, 852-54 (N.D. 1966).
8. N.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a). See,e.g., Carr v. Carr, 300 N.W.2d 40, 42 (N.D. 1980); Haugeberg v.
Haugeberg, 258 N.W.2d 657, 659 (N.D. 1977). Under Rule 52(a), findings of fact are clearly
erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made. Clark v. Clark, 331 N.W.2d 277, 278 (N.D. 1983); Smith v. Smith, 326 N.W.2d 697,
700 (N.D. 1982). Also, distributions may be set aside if they were induced by an erroneous view of
the law. Delorey v. Delorey, 357 N.W.2d 488 (N.D. 1984); Haberstroh v. Haberstroh, 258 N.W.2d
669 (N.D. 1977). Rule 52(a) also applies to motions to modify divorce decrees. Corbin v. Corbin,
288 N.W.2d 61, 65 (N.D. 1980); Becker v. Becker, 262 N.W.2d 478, 481 (N.D. 1978). But see Oviatt
v. Oviatt, 355 N.W.2d 825, 828 (N.D. 1984) (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially) (agreeing with
Justice Sand that distributions of property are conclusions of law and finding rationale equally
applicable to awards of spousal support); Clark v. Clark, 331 N.W.2d 277, 279 (N.D. 1983) (Sand,
J., concurring specially) (distributions of property, because they are determined by equitable
principles of law, should be reviewed as conclusions of law).
9. See, e.g., Urlaub v. Urlaub, 348 N.W.2d 454, 456 (N.D. 1984) (having been made aware of
net worth, court holds that trial court distribution not clearly erroneous); Urlaub v. Urlaub, 325
N.W.2d 234, 237-38 (N.D. 1982) (remand for purpose of determining value of property and
rationale for fiscal allocations). Trial courts should normally use the elementary accounting equation
of assets minus liabilities in determining the net worth of marital property. Linn v. Linn, 370
N.W.2d 536, 541 n. 3 (N.D. 1985).
10. There are no fixed rules by which the guidelines are to be applied. See, e.g., Martin v.
Martin, 307 N.W.2d 541 (N.D. 1981); Midboe v. Midboe, 303 N.W.2d 548 (N.D. 1981). What is
equitable depends upon the circumstances in a particular case. Graves v. Graves, 340 N.W.2d 903,
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court need not make particular findings as to each guideline,I 1 but
it must determine the net worth of property before the other
guidelines come into play,' 2 and it must specify a rationale for the
distribution it orders. ' 3 The guidelines are intended to aid the trial
court in exercising its discretion in formulating equitable terms and
conditions for post-marital fiscal allocations 14 or in deciding
whether the terms and conditions of stipulated agreements between
the former spouses are equitable. 15 They neither imply nor depend
upon particular reasons why post-marital support may be
equitable. 16 They are, however, grounded in an understanding of
why it may be equitable to redistribute property after a marriage.
III. EQUITABLE REDISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
In North Dakota, judicial power to redistribute property after
a marriage is based on recognition of "the husband's and the wife's
respective rights to an equitable portion of the property which has
been accumulated by the parties through their joint efforts and for
their mutual benefit. "17 It is no longer a controversial or minority
perception that non-income producing spouses as well as those who
work outside their homes perform economically valuable roles and
contribute to their marriages as economic partners. All states now
reflect the premise of marriage as a shared economic enterprise by
providing distribution of property during or after marriage."8
While it is perhaps ironic that greater awareness of the value of the
9(16 (N.D. 1983); Tuffv. Tuff, 333 N.W.2d 421, 423 (N.D. 1983).
11. E.g., Graves v. Graves, 340 N.W.2d 903, 906 (N.D. 1983); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 284
N.W.2d 576, 581 (N.D. 1979).
12. E.g., Lentz v. Lentz, 353 N.W.2d 742, 745 (N.D. 1984); Winter v. Winter, 338 N.W.2d
819, 821 (N.D. 1983). Rule 8.3 of the North Dakota Rules of Court requires parties in contested
divorces to assign value to property possessed by the parties. N.D.R.O.C. 8.3.
13. E.g., VanRosendale v. VanRosendale, 333 N.W.2d 790, 791 (N.D. 1983); Tuffv. Tuff,
333 N.W.2d 421, 424 (N.D. 1983). Articulation of a rationale is necessary in order "to aid the trial
court in reaching a reasonable determination and to aid [the appellate court] in giving meaningful
-, 343 N.W.2d 796,
review of the discretionary decision." Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200,
804 (1984).
14. E.g., Sanford v. Sanford, 301 N.W.2d 118, 126 (N.D. 1980); Carr v. Carr, 300 N.W.2d 40,
42 (N.D.1980).
15. E.g., Bismarck Tribune Co. v. Bowman, 293 N.W.2d 133, 136 (N.D. 1980); Rummel v.
Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848, 852 (N .D. 1975).
16. All jurisdictions examine factors similar to those found in the Ruff-Fischer guidelines in
making post-marital allocations. Note, 7he Economics of Divorce: Alimony and Property Awards, 43 U.
CtN. L. REv. 133, 138-39 (1974). Therefore, such guidelines themselves cannot be thought to define
a particular policy. In North Dakota, the Ruff-Fischer guidelines have remained the same in cases
declaring that alimony is a continuation of marital support and in cases declaring that it is not.
17. Lipp v. Lipp, 355 N.W.2d 817, 820 (N.D. 1984); Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754,
758 (N.D. 1981). The power to distribute property equitably after a divorce means that courts may
divide separate orjointly held poperty regardless of itslegal or equitable title. An equitable property
division need not be equal. E.g., Lippert v. Lippcrt, 353 N.W.2d 333, 336 (N.D. 1984); Piper v.
Piper, 239 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1975).
18. In the eight community property states, -communily property'' acquired after marriage is
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work done by women as homemakers has come at a time when an
increasing number of women work in income-producing jobs
outside their homes, that awareness reflects recognition that
spouses choose among different but equally valuable economic
roles within marriage. Spousal decisions about their respective
roles within marriage are presumably shared, 19 as are their efforts
and the consequences of those efforts.
Acknowledgment of tangible property as the product of shared
efforts by non-income-producing and income-producing spouses
appeared in North Dakota cases long before the current popularity
of the idea of marriage as an economic partnership. That premise is
now firmly established as the rationale for equitable property
redistribution. Earlier courts undoubtedly felt more comfortable
attributing value to those contributions of wives that could be
linked directly to income production by their husbands, as when
20
the wife assisted in a business enterprise on a non-salaried basis.
Even though it is more difficult to quantify contributions of a
spouse who is not playing a wage-associated role, contemporary
owned jointly during the marriage and is distributed at divorce. The forty-two common law states
now have either "deferred community property" or "equitable distribution" at divorce.
In deferred community property states, "marital property" acquired after marriage is
distributed at divorce. Comment, The Development of Sharing Principlesin Common Law Marital Property
States, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1269, 1282 (1981). See also UNiF. MARRIAGE AND DIvoRcE ACT S 307
(alternative B); Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 48 (Minn. 1984) (award of non-marital property
notI clearly erroneous); Dammann v. Dammann, 351 N.W.2d 651, 652 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(abuse of discretion for trial court to divide non-marital property).
Equitable distribution states such as North Dakota permit courts at divorce to distribute all
property, including property acquired before the marriage. See, e.g., Fraase v. Fraase, 315 N.W.2d
271, 273-74 (N.D. 1982). Courts can also distribute property obtained by gift or inheritance during
the marriage. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Schmidt, 325 N.W.2d 230, 233 (N.D. 1982); Hoge v. Hoge, 281
N.W.2d 557, 561 (N.D. 1979). See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (alternative A).
In the nineteenth century, common-law states distributed property at divorce according to legal
title. By 1984 all common-law states authorized redistribution. Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty
States. An Overview, 18 FAM. L. Q. 369, 390-92 (1985) (authors do not label Mississippi as an
equitable distribution state but acknowledge that recent judicial decisions permit that
characterization).
19. Prager, Sharing Principlesand the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1, 6(1977).
The author discusses the marital decision-making process as follows:
In marriage most of us seek an alliance with another individual who will believe in us,
be loyal to us, help us function in a demanding, often hostile world, and who will help
make life satisfying. In exchange we will try to do the same. In many senses these
needs and the expectations they create shape the frame of mind with which decisions
are made during marriage. The expectation of stability and continuity and the desire
fior a shared life suggest that married people are unlikely to make decisions on an
individually oriented basis; rather the needs of each person tend to be taken into
account. Thus married people will often make decisions differently than they would if
there were no marriage or marriage-like relationship functioning.
Id.
20. Farm wives play an important role in the farm enterprise. In a 1982-83 study of North
Dakota farm families, 90% of the wives reported that they were involved in the farm operation. Sixty
percent did bookkeeping; 61% were involved in business decision-making; 54% operated
equipment; 42% cared for livestock; 76% prepared meals and/or did laundry for hired men. Sevcn
percent received a salary for their work. Light, Hanson, & Hertsgaard, The Work of North Dakota Farm
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courts are now willing to attribute value to both spouses for

property accumulated through their joint efforts and for their
mutual benefit, and to recognize the value to the marital unit of the
fact that, for example, the wife devoted "a substantial part of her

productive life to the marriage, raising their three children,
handling the family's finances, entertaining [her husband's]
business clientele, and generally providing the type of support and
services that a homemaker usually ,provides. "21 While that
recognition is accepted as the premise for equitable redistribution
of property, it has not been seen so clearly relevant to possible postmarital support obligations.22
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF POST-MARITAL
ALLOCATIONS

FISCAL

Although it applies the Ruff-Fischer guidelines to both spousal
support and property distribution, the North Dakota Supreme
Court has insisted that the two post-marital allocations have
different purposes and are distinguishable. 23 It treats the allocations
and Ranch Women, N.D. FARM RESEARCH MAG. 25-26 (1983). Noting that property sharing principles
in common-law states first developed in Kansas and Oklahoma, one commentator observes that
rural women took active roles in the family business long before their urban counterparts and
suggests that "sharing-based legislation [developed] because of the economic realities of farm life."
Comment,supra note 18, at 1309.

21. Nastrom v. Nastrom, 284 N.W.2d 576, 581 (N.D. 1979). See also Briese v. Briese, 325
N.W.2d 245 (N.D. 1982). In recognizing the wife's contribution to the marriage, the court in Briese
stated as follows:
This is a situation where both parties entered into the marriage with relatively little
property. Kenneth worked to earn money to provide forhis family. He handled the
financial and business affairs of the familiy. During the 31 years of her marriage,
Florence performed the tasks of a homemaker. She took care of the home and played
an active role in raising eight children. It cannot be said that this was an insignificant
contribution to the marriage.
Id. at 247. See also Comment, supra note 18, at 1310. The author states as follows:
[Mjarriages are increasingly viewed as partnerships, with spouses working toward
common goals. In a partnership marriage, one spouse must sometimes temporarily
put aside Isis or her individual interests or goals to promote the goals of the other
spouse, or of the marital unit. Examples include working to Finance the education of
the other or staying at home to care for children. This situation creates the expectation
and reality that spouses will share assets and income during the marriage. States with
sharing principles inproperty distribution are recognizing these expectations when the
marriage is dissolved.
Id.
22. Alimony is disfavored because it continues an often acrimonious fiscal relationship between
persons whose other legal bonds have been dissolved. Beyond that, however, it has been thought
widely and wrongly available to "alimony drones who neither toil nor spin" and are assured of
support for life. Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14
FAM. L. Q. 141, 142-43 (1980). In fact, only 9.3% of divorces between 1887 and 1906 included
alimony provisions. In 1916, 15.4% awarded alimony, and in 1922, 14.6% included alimony
provisions. Id. at 180 (census data). In a 1975 poll, 14% of divorced wives reported they had been
awarded alimony. Id. at 143.
23. See, e.g., Lipp v. Lipp, 355 N.W.2d 817, 821 (N.D. 1984) ("To be spousal support a
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differently in one way that can make their characterization crucial.
The court has construed the last sentence of section 14-05-24 of the
North Dakota Century Code2 4 as permitting judicial modification
of spousal support provisions in divorce decrees if there has been a
material change in the financial need of one party or ability to pay
of the other 2 5 but as not permitting modification of property
distributions. 26 The fact that support creates a modifiable fiscal
relationship between former spouses which survives the dissolution
of their marriages makes it a frequent source of later litigation.
Although spousal maintenance and property distribution also differ
2 8 and bankruptcy, 29
as to matters of enforceability,2 7 taxation,
characterization problems in reported North Dakota cases deal
primarily with questions of modification. Indeed, modifiability
emerges as the essential attribute distinguishing maintenance from
post-marital property division."
Spousal support is popularly thought of in terms of
continuing, periodic payments while property division is associated
with a one-step allocation of tangible property. 3t A court can award
provision in a divorce judgment must effectuate the purposes of spousal support, such as
rehabilitation or maintenance"); Sventenko v. Sventenko, 306 N.W.2d 607, 610 (N.D. 1981);
Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754, 758 (N.D. 1981).
24. Williams, 302 N.W.2d at 758.
25. Cook v. Cook, 364 N.W.2d 74, 76 (N .D. 1985). Generally, the changed circumstances must
be substantial, involuntary, and not contemplated at the time of the previous order. Muehler v.
Muehler, 333 N.W.2d 432, 434 (N.D. 1983). Even when there has been a material and dramatic
increase in the need of a former spouse, however, a court lacks jurisdiction to order payment of
alimony if there is no initial award of alimony to modify and no express reservation ofjurisdiction in
the divorce decree. Becker v. Becker, 262 N.W.2d 478, 482 (N.D. 1978).
26. Although the last sentence of S 14-05-24 of the North Dakota Century Code seems literally
to make property distribution as well as maintenance modifiable, the North Dakota Supreme Court
does not so interpret it. See, e.g., Wikstrom v. Wikstrom, 359 N.W.2d 821, 823 (N.D. 1984); Becker
v. Becker, 262 N.W.2d 478, 481 (N.D. 1978). In Becker, the North Dakota Supreme Court refused
to reconsider its treatment of property distributions as final, in spite of facts that made application of
that doctrine very harsh. Id. at 480-81, 484. A property judgment can be "clarified," however, by
defining obligations without changing substantive rights. Wastvedt v. Wastvedt, 371 N.W.2d 142,
145 (N.D. 1985). A 1980judgment awarded the home to the wife and ordered the husband to make
payments, including mortgage principle, insurance, interest, and tax payments. Id.at 143. When
the house was sold, the judgment was "clarified" t) order only payment of principle and interest to
the wife. Id.
27. Scablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920, 924-25 (N.D. 1984); Dvorak v. Dvorak, 329
N.W.2d 868, 870 (N.D. 1983). For a detailed discussion of the enforceability of support and property
judgments, see Trentadue, Obtaining an Enforceable Division of the Marital Estate in North Dakota, 61
N.D.L. REV. __
(1985).
28. See Rosen & Burke, Putting a Value on a ProfessionalLicense, FAM. Aovoc., Summer 1984, at
23.
29. Debts based on post-marital alimony, maintenance, or support obligations to a spouse or
former spouse are explicitly excepted from discharge in bankruptcy so long as they are not assigned
to someone other than the state as a condition of eligibility fir welfare. 11 U.S.C. S 253(a) (5) (1982).
Debts owing on a property settlement are dischargeable. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d at 925. For a
discussion of ways to minimize risks of losing a property settlement in subsequent bankruptcy
proceedings, see Trentadue, supra note 27, at _.
30. See Delorey v. Delorcy, 357 N.W.2d 488, 490 (N.D. 1984) (whether payments are
modifiable depends on whether they are actually a property division or spousal support); Lipp v.
Lipp, 355 N.W.2d 817, 818 (N.D. 1984) (referee implicitly treated payments as spousal support and
therefore modifiable).
31.J. AREEN, FAMticY LAw 664 (1978).
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alimony in a lump sum, however, instead of by periodic
payments. 32 Conversely, one party may retain most or all of the
actual property that is constructively divided, paying a money
33
equivalent to the other party in lieu of transferring the property.
The payor spouse can make such money property settlements in a
lump sum or in installments. 34 Neither the mode of payment nor
whether money or property is transferred, then, can conclusively
establish the characterization of a post-marital fiscal transfer. Nor
does the label put on a fiscal transfer in stipulations agreed to by the
parties or in a divorce decree necessarily settle the question of
characterization. 35
In determining whether a particular provision in a decree is for
alimony in the sense of spousal maintenance rather than in the
nature of a property settlement, North Dakota cases have not
always differentiated between questions of the construction and
status of provisions in a stipulation and in a judgment.
Considerable confusion can be avoided by not blurring these
separate inquiries.
Constructions of particular provisions in stipulations, as well
as the validity of any or all parts of a stipulation, are generally
governed by rules and principles of contract law. 36 A party seeking
to set aside provisions of a divorce decree based upon a stipulation
has the additional burden of establishing a basis for rescinding the
32. E.g., Sanford v. Sanford, 301 N.W.2d 118, 128 (N.D. 1980); DeRoche v. DeRoche, 12
N.D. 17, 21-23, 94 N.W. 767, 768-69 (1903). Payment of alimony in a lump sum may be preferred
in order to avoid termination by the remarriage of the recipient, the death of either party, or
substantial changes in financial circumstances. Once it is understood that alimony can be paid in
gross in order to avoid risks of modifiability, the inadequacy of defining alimony by its modifiability
is apparent.
33. A spouse may prefer a property division made in periodic payments in order to keep
productive property in the payor's control. See, e.g., Rudel v. Rudel, 279 N.W.2d 651, 655-56 (N.D.
1979). See also Webber v. Webber, 308 N.W.2d 548, 549-50 (N.D. 1981); Eberhart v. Eberhart, 301
N.W.2d 137, 143 (N.D. 1981).
34. E.g., Pankow v. Pankow, 347 N.W.2d 566, 568 (N.D. 1984) (court awarded a monthly
payment of $575 for 25 years as property division); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 217 N.W.2d 792, 794
(N.D. 1974) (court awarded a monthly payment of $500 for 15 years). Periodic cash payments
without interest awarded as part of a property distribution must be discounted in determining their
present value. Pankow v. Pankow, 347 N.W.2d 566, 568 (N.D. 1984); Lippert v. Lippert, 353
N.W.2d 333, 336 n.l (N.D. 1984); Tuffv. Tuff333 N.W.2d 421, 424 (N.D. 1983). Courts should
avoid a property division that will damage a party's capacity to earn a live'ihood or destroy the value
of the property. Pankow v. Pankow, 371 N.W.2d 153, 157 (N.D. 1985).
35. E.g., Seablom v. Scablom, 348 N.W.2d 920, 923-24 (N.D. 1984) (the parties' attorneys
agreed to describe $500 monthly payments as alimony and trial court adopted that language in its
decree; North Dakota Supreme Court held that provision constituted a property distribution).
North Dakota casclaw sometimes distinguishes "true" or "technical" alimony "in the nature
of support," e.g., Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754, 758 (N.D. 1981) and Eberhart v.
Eberhart, 301 N.W.2d 137, 139 (N.D. 1981), firom "alimony in the nature of a property division,"
e.g., In re Estate ofGustafson, 287 N.W.2d 700, 702 (N.D. 1980); Sinkler v. Sinkler, 49 N.D. 1144,
1152, 194 N.W. 817, 819 (1923). Because of the ambiguities in usage of the term, the North Dakota
Supreme Court prefers the term "spousal support." See supra note 1.
36. E.g., Rummel v. Rummel, 234 N.W.2d 848, 852 (N.D. 1975); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 217
N.W.2d 792, 796 (N.D. 1974); Bailey v. Bailey, 53 N.D. 887, 895, 207 N.W. 987, 990 (1926).
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stipulation as a matter of contract law. 3 A trial court in a divorce
proceeding is bound by stipulations allocating property in valid
separation agreements that purport to have final and binding effect
in the event of divorce. 38 Since post-marital property distributions
are not subject to judicial modification, 39 a court can only alter
provisions for property division in a final decree if the judgment
itself can be vacated for reasons that would justify relief from any
judgment under Rule 60 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
40
Procedure.
If the trial judge accepts and incorporates stipulated provisions
for maintenance in the divorce decree, however, those provisions
become judicial provisions and are governed by rules and
principles applicable to judgments rather than by contract law. It
follows that a trial court can modify a provision for spousal support
in a judgment even though the provision was initially based on the
parties' agreement. 4 1 Trial courts are advised, however, to be
reluctant to modify support provisions that were stipulated by the
42
parties rather than imposed by the court.
The separate question of whether stipulations retain legal

-

37. E.g., Dvorak v. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d 868, 870 (N.D. 1983).
38. Peterson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 743, 745 (N.D. 1981). Peterson is squarely in conflict with,
and must therefore implicitly overrule, at least two earlier North Dakota decisions. See Halla v.
Halla, 200 N.W.2d 271 (N.D. 1972); Kack v. Kack, 169 N.W.2d 1II (N.D. 1969). Peterson
recognized the right of a husband and wife to contract with each other regarding their property.
Tiokasin v. Haas, 370 N.W.2d 559, 562 (N.D. 1985). Peterson does not imply that divorcing or
divorced parents can control their child support obligations by private agreement. See Tiokasin, 370
N.W.2d at 562.
39. See supra note 26.
40. N.D.R. Civ. P. 60; Dvorak v. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d 868, 869-72 (N.D. 1983). Rule 60
permits reopening a judgment on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect,
newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct of an adverse party, or any other
basis justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. N.D.R. Ctv. P. 60. Parties attempting to
obtain Rule 60 relief by claims that they were alcoholic or intoxicated at the time of agreeing to
stipulations subsequently incorporated into judgments have usually been unsuccessful. See
Bridgeford v. Bridgeford, 281 N.W.2d 583, 588 (N.D. 1979); Bingert v. Bingert, 247 N.W.2d 464,
466 (N.D. 1976). Nor is it sufficient to allege that one spouse's threats and false statements caused
the other spouse to enter into a stipulation. Jostad v. Jostad, 285 N.W.2d 583, 586 (N.D. 1979). But
see Galloway v. Galloway, 281 N.W.2d 804, 807 (N.D. 1979) (court reopened judgment because
alcoholism had left appellant-wife incompetent to contract); Suko v. Suko, 304 N.W.2d 690, 693
(N.D. 1981) (judgment reopened to add provision inadvertently omitted from divorce decree).
41. Cook v. Cook, 364 N.W.2d 74, 76 n.2 (N.D. 1985).
42. Bingert v. Bingert, 247 N.W.2d 464, 467 (N.D. 1976); Bryant v. Bryant, 102 N.W.2d 800,
807 (N.D. 1960). The North Dakota Supreme Court believes that this reluctance protects a party
from being misled into accepting a less than equitable distribution of property because a specified
monthly payment has been agreed upon. See Eberhart v. Eberhart, 301 N.W.2d 137, 143 (N.D.
1981).
In Bauer v. Bauer, Justice Sand expressed concern about modifying contractual agreements for
spousal support, observing that during his service on the North Dakota Supreme Court "its powers
have been invoked frequently to reduce or eliminate spousal support because of changed
circumstances" but that "[d]uring this time I do not recall having had a request to increase the
payment because of changed circumstances, such as sickness of the unmarried recipient." Bauer v.
Bauer, 356 N.W.2d 897, 900 (N.D. 1984) (Sand, J., concurring specially). He added that "I would
not be surprised that in such circumstances the paying party would make strong persuasive
arguments that the contract or agreement entered into controlled and the request for increased
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status independent of their embodiment in judicial decrees is a
43
simple issue of incorporation with merger or with non-merger. If
a stipulation merges into a decree in which its provisions are
incorporated, it has no continued existence as a contract. If a
stipulation is incorporated but not merged, its alimony provision
then takes on a dual existence: as a provision of the judgment, it is
subject to judicial modification and enforceable as a judgment; as a
provision of a private contract, it is enforceable as a contract and
44
may be modifiable only as a contract.
Once problems of characterization and merger are isolated
and resolved, it becomes evident that a deeper uncertainty has
pervaded discussion of spousal support. That uncertainty has been
caused by insufficient examination of the appropriate functions of
such support in contemporary law. The North Dakota Supreme
Court has twice held that stipulated periodic payments were
intended to be property divisions when the payments would not
terminate at the death of the recipient. 45 Beyond that, North
Dakota case law suggests that modifiability is the single predictable
consequence of characterizing an allocation as spousal support
rather than as a property distribution, 46 but until recently it did not
explain why a modifiable and so necessarily continuing relationship
payments should be denied." Id.
43. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 553, 564 (1976). There is a
possibility that a stipulation might be approved or referred to in a judgment without being
incorporated into the judgment, in which case it has the effect of a private contract only. Id.
Reported North Dakota cases do not reflect this practice, however.
44. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 465 A.2d 436, 440-41 (Md. 1983). Ifa court modifies an alimony
award by reducing it and enforces payment of the reduced amount as a judgment, the difference
between the amount paid under the judgment and the amount due under the non-merged stipulation
would accrue as a contractual debt. Section 306(e) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act makes
non-merger mandatory when a stipulation is incorporated. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §

306(e) (amended 1971). This is a reversal of the policy of the original 1970 Act, which provided that
an agreement whose terms were incorporated into a decree was no longer enforceable as a contract.
For an example of an explicit non-merger provision in a stipulation, see Peterson v. Peterson,
313 N.W.2d 743, 744 (N.D. 1981). The North Dakota Supreme Court apparently relied upon the
non-merger clause in treating the property provisions of the parties' agreements as ordinarily
binding the trial court. That is not necessarily a consequence of non-merger, however, since the
provisions can survive as a binding contract between the parties even if they are changed by the court
in formulatingjudicial provisions.
45. Seablom v. Seablom, 348 N.W.2d 920, 924 (N.D. 1984) (stipulation provided payments
would not terminate on remarriage or death of either party, but "obligee's death ends the need for
the rehabilitative or permanent maintenance, the purposes of spousal support"); Coulter v. Coulter,
328 N.W.2d 232, 239 (N.D. 1982) (because of promissory note, obligator would be obliged to make
payments regardless of whether or not a material change occurred in the circumstances of one of the
parties; if payments were alimony in the nature of spousal support, the amount could have been
modified).
In Bullock v. Bullock, the court stated that the award of a share of military retirement pay to a
wife until either she or her former husband died did not suggest that the payments constituted
spousal support rather than property redistribution, however, because payments enforced through
the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act must terminate at the date of the death of
the service member or the former spouse. Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904, 909 (N.D. 1984).
46. E.g., Delorey v. Delorey, 357 N.W.2d 488, 490 (N.D. 1984) (spousal support is subject to
modification upon proof of changed circumstances, while property division is a final determination);
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between former spouses might appropriately survive the dissolution
of their marriage. In the absence of a clear understanding of the
purposes of maintenance, it is not surprising that trial courts have
sometimes failed to differentiate clearly between support and post47
marital fiscal allocations of property.

V. TRADITIONAL ALIMONY TO CONTINUE MARITAL
SUPPORT
Until comparatively recently, there was a well-established
concept of post-marital support. Before 1976, North Dakota cases
reflected unqualified acceptance of statutory alimony as the
common-law concept of continuation after divorce of the husband's
duty to support and maintain his wife during marriage.4 8 It was this
notion of a right to alimony as arising from the single fact of having
been married that encouraged misconceptions of large numbers of.
"alimony drones who neither toil nor spin" and who were assured
49
a lifetime support.
Alimony as a continuation of a husband's duty to support his
wife was explicitly endorsed in a 1967 case in which the North
Dakota Supreme Court decided as a question of first impression
that the remarriage of an alimony recipient creates a prima facie
case forjudicial termination of alimony. 50 The court reasoned that,

Sinkler v. Sinkler, 49 N.D. 1144, 1148, 194 N.W. 817, 818 (1923) (whether disputed payments could
be modified depended upon whether they were technical alimony, and whether they were technical
alimony depended on whether they could be modified).
47. E.g., Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754, 758 (N.D. 1981) (trial court suggested
payments to wife would be rehabilitative, but also spoke of the payments as a division of the
property); Haugeberg v. Haugeberg, 258 N.W.2d 657, 661 (N.D. 1977) (trial court awarded $300 a
month for 26 months, saying "[wjhether you call it alimony or a property division, she is entitled to
this amount of money over and above the other property awarded her").
48. E.g., Bingert v. Bingert, 247 N.W.2d 464 (N.D. 1976); Sinkler v. Sinkler, 49 N.D. 1144,
194 N.W. 817 (1923); Hagert v. Templeton, 18 N.D. 525, 123 N.W. 283 (1909). See also H. CLARK,
.upra note 43, at 219-29.
49. See Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 22, at 143.
50. Nugent v. Nugent, 152 N.W.2d 323, 327 (N.D. 1967). Furthermore, Nugent held that
liability for alimony should be terminated retroactive to the date of remarriage. Id. at 329. That is an
exception to the usual rule that there can be no modification of accrued alimony. Richter v. Richter,
126 N.W.2d 634, 635 (N.D. 1964). Cf Kinsella v. Kinsella, 181 N.W.2d 764, 770 (N.D. 1970)
(accrued child support cannot be modified). North Dakota Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Nugent
rule. Bauer v. Bauer, 356 N.W.2d 897, 898 (N.D. 1984); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487,
490 (N.D. 1978). The court said in Nugent that extraordinary circumstances might rebut the prima
facie case for terminating alimony upon the remarriage ofthe recipient. Nugent, 152 N.W.2d at 327.
In 1984, it fiund that such extraordinary circumstances justified continuation of an express
agreement to pay post high school education expenses. Bauer, 356 N.W.2d at 899-900. See infra note
147 and accompanying text. In 1985, it upheld a court-imposed award of rehabilitative spousal
support to a remarried recipient. Bullock v. Bullock, 376 N.W.2d 30 (N.D. 1985). See infra note 148
and accompanying text.
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since an award of alimony was a continuation under court order of
the husband's obligation to support the wife, it would be against
public policy, illogical, unreasonable, and unseemly "for one man
to be supporting the wife of another who himself assumed this
obligation for her support. ' 5' Continuation of alimony after
remarriage of a recipient former wife would have the effect, the
court remarked three years later, of permitting a woman "the
52
financial benefit of having two husbands at one time."
The deeply ingrained assumption that remarriage terminates
alimony may have made that remark seem acceptable in 1970. The
image of women, however, had begun to change; the stereotype of
wives as passive and helpless recipients of support had in most other
respects become an anachronism. Nonetheless, continuation after
divorce of a spousal duty to support developed out of the traditional
view of marriage as a matter of economic role division, with the
husband as economic provider and the wife as economic dependent
and as subservient. The common law duty of a husband to support
his wife compensated the wife for the fact that at common law "her
time, services, and accumulations after marriage became [her
husband's] absolutely. 53 In return, the husband was responsible
for her maintenance; the law thus secured her a home and "all her
reasonable wants, according to his means and station in life. 54
Alimony was first granted by English ecclesiastical courts at a
time when the courts authorized legal separation but not divorce.
Since the husband retained control of his estranged wife's property,
alimony substituted for her guarantee of maintenance within his
household. That marital guarantee continued after married women
51. Nugent v. Nugent, 152 N.W.2d 323, 327-28 (N.D. 1968). Alimony as a variant spousal
support device presupposes that single, formerly married women are generally and permanently
incapable of self-sufficiency but are likely to find new husbands to take care of them.
52. Kinsella v. Kinsella, 181 N.W.2d 764, 770 (N.D. 1970). The assumption that alimony
recipients were female was apparently unshaken by the fact that North Dakota since 1911 has
authorized post-marital suppdrt for either former spouse. Early North Dakota statutory law deviated
from common law in making wives liable for support and maintenance of husbands under certain
limited circumstances. N.D. REV. CODE S 4077 (1905) (currently codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S 1407-03 (Supp. 1985)). See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 184, 1911 N.D. Sess. Laws 284 (codified at N.D.
CENT. CODE S 14-05-24 (1981) (alimony permitted for either spouse)). Making alimony available to
either spouse reflected reciprocal spousal liabilities during marriage. Thus, the law reinforced rather
than altered the concept of alimony as a post-marital continuation of marital support. Requiring
wives to support their husbands was considered only in extremely unusual circumstances. E.g.,
McLean v. McLean, 69 N.D. 665, 668, 290 N.W. 913, 914 (1940); Hagert v. Hagert, 22 N.D. 290,
292-93, 133 N.W. 1035, 1036 (1911). As a result, alimony continued to be conceptualized as a
continuation of marital support for wives.
The United States Supreme Court held in 1979 that state law permitting alimony for wives but
not for husbands violated the equal protection clause requirement that differential treatment on the
basis of gender be substantially related to important governmental objectives. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979).
53. See Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 22, at 146; Mahoney, Economic Sharing During Marriage:
Equal Protection, Spousal Support andthe Doctrine of Necessaries, 22J. FAM. L. 221,224-25 (1983-84).
54. Glynn v. Glynn, 8 N.D. 233, 236, 77 N.W. 594, 596 (1898). Cf Weitzman & Dixon, supra
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were permitted to keep control of their separate property, 55
reflecting the fact that few women entered marriage with enough
property to make them self-sufficient and that their marital roles as
homemakers prevented them from acquiring assets or developing
income-producing capacities. The boundaries of the guarantee
were set by ability and need: the level of support, of course, could
not exceed the husband's ability to provide it; the minimal need of
a wife was put at a level of basic necessities. 56
It is not clear, historically, why courts continued to enforce the
husband's duty to support his wife even after divorce. A plausible
explanation is that the courts wanted to keep divorced women from
becoming paupers at a time when there were few opportunities for
57
them to work in income-producing jobs outside the home.
Certainly need became a guiding principle that could be inferred
from patterns of traditional alimony. According to this principle, a
person was entitled to be supported by a former spouse at least "at
a level sufficient to stay off the welfare rolls. "58 Associations of
alimony with notions of private charity for helplessly dependent
persons may have come out of this period; there was no suggestion
of value from the contributions of non-income producing spouses
that might give rise to post-marital entitlements.
The need principle was complicated by the competing
principle of fault. It was only the virtuous wife who enjoyed the
common-law guarantee of marital support: support was in the
nature of a privilege which she might wholly forfeit "by her own
fault and folly," irrespective of the quality and duration of her
note 22, at 146.
55. Mahoney, supra note 53, at 225. See also N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-07-05 (1981) (North
Dakota's Married Women's Property Act permitted married women to retain their own property).
Married women's property acts have been adopted by all states. H. CLARK, supra note 43, at 222-28.
56. Glynn v. Glynn, 8 N.D. 233, 236, 77 N.W. 594, 596 (1898). Cf N.D. CENT. CODE S14-0711 (Supp. 1983) (abandoned spouse not liable for support unless there is an offer to return or
abandonment was justified by misconduct).
An affluent husband was not obligated to support his wife to the extent of his greater ability,
however. Beyond the provision of basic necessaries, the husband rather than the law determined the
appropriate level of support within an ongoing marriage. Many former law students will remember
McGuire v. McGuire as the casebook example of an affluent farmer not required to support his 66year-old ailing wife beyond furnishing her minimal needs. McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 236,
59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (1953). See also Mahoney, supra note 53, at 227-28. SeeJ. AREEN supra note 31, at
636. The 4uthor states, "Common sense, of course, dictates that no award should exceed the paying
spouse's ability to pay, either at the divorce, or over time. In this sense, the net worth and incomeearning ability of the paying spouse creates a ceiling which no award can realistically exceed." Id.
57. Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Sweeping Reform, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 67, 74
(1980); J. AREEN, supra note 31, at 632. To the extent that alimony was justified by the lack of
opportunities for women to support themselves, the rationale weakened as women began to have
more opportunities. H. CLARK, supra note 43, at 422.
Alternatively, the duty may be explained as a matter of simple literalism in applying to divorce
the body of law that had been developed for legal separation. Cf Teitelbaum, Cruelty Divorce Under
A\lv York's Reform Act: On Repeating Ancient Error, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 24-28 (1973).
58. J. AREE., supra note 31, at 422.
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wifely services preceding her folly. 59 In the relatively recent past,
divorce was available only if one spouse was found guilty of a
matrimonial offense 60 and the other spouse was at least relatively
innocent. 61 Courts denied alimony to a wife divorced for her fault
but authorized alimony as continued support for a worthy wife
divorced because of her husband's fault. 6 During this time
property was generally distributed at divorce according to its legal
title. Therefore, fault as a crucial consideration sometimes
mitigated economic hardship for a wife who had little or no
property. 63 Of course the fault doctrine could not protect a wife
who was not without fault, however valuable her contributions to
the marriage had been, because it did not recognize that
entitlements could be created by the contributions of a non-income
producing and non-title-holding spouse.
In time courts relaxed the rule that unvirtuous wives forfeited
all post-marital fiscal allocations, 64 at least in part because of the
strong public interest in keeping even guilty spouses from being
public charges. 6 5 During this same period, states moved away from
permitting divorce only when one spouse was guilty of a
matrimonial fault. All states now permit divorce upon a showing
59. Glynn v. Glynn, 8 N.D. 233, 236, 77 N.W. 594, 596 (1898) (rejecting argument that wife
divorced for fault should have alimony because she had faithfully discharged her duties as a wife for
many years and had materially aided her husband in the accumulation of his present property). See
also Kelso, The ChangingSocial Setting ofAlimony Law, 6 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 186, 187-88 (1939).
Cf N.D. CENT. CODE S 14-07-11 (Supp. 1985) (abandoned spouse not liable for support).
60. Although scattered prototypes of no-fault grounds for divorce were available in the United
States as early as the 1850s, California is generally credited with having adopted the first modern
statute in 1970. See CAL. CiV. CODE 5§ 4500-5138 (West 1986).
61. The harsh doctrine of recrimination was a "mandatory defense" that precluded divorce
when both parties were at fault. It was softened in some jurisdictions by the doctrine of comparative
rectitude, which permitted divorce when one spouse was less guilty even though not completely
innocent. E.g., Dewitt v. Dewitt, 296 N.W.2d 761, 763 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980). North Dakota
repealed its recrimination statute in 1963. See 1963 N.D. Sess. Laws 205.
62. For a discussion of the common-law rule that no alimony can be awarded to an unvirtuous
wife, see Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Sweeping Reform, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 67, 74
(1980); Glynn v. Glynn, 8 N.D. 233, 237, 77 N.W. 594, 597 (1898). North Dakota statutory law
from 1883 until 1911 reinforced that common-law rule by authorizing maintenance for a wife only
when a court granted a divorce for the fault of her husband. N.D. REV. CODE SS 2761, 2762 (1899);
N.D. Civ. CODE S 73 (1883) (identical to § 73 of Field Code, reported for adoption in New York in
1865). Cf Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 22, at 146.
63. See Krauskopf, Recompense for FinancingSpouse's Education: Legal Protectorfor the MaritalInvestor
in Human Capital, 28 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 395-96 (1980). The author states as follows:
The homemaker, who had not had the opportunity to earn money or to acquire any
property, ordinarily did not wish to be divorced because she needed the economic
security of marriage. Her strongest bargaining tool for economic settlement was the
threat of preventing divorce by showing fault by the husband.
Id.
64. J. AREEN, supra note 31, at 634. E.g., Halla v. Halla, 200 N.W.2d 271 (N.D. 1972); Agrest
v. Agrest, 75 N.D. 318, 27 N.W.2d 697 (1947).
65. Glover v. Glover, 64 Misc.2d 374, 314 N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970) (court, finding
wife's conduct "grievous and loathsome," required husband to pay alimony at welfare level rather
than according to his means).
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that the marriage is in fact over, without insisting that one spouse
be blamed for its failure. 66 In 1971, North Dakota adopted a
provision that permits divorce upon a showing of irreconcilable
differences. 67 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in
interpreting that statute, held that fault was still a significant
alimony. 68 The continuing
consideration in determining
importance of fault in determining spousal support may have the
unintended effect of evoking old notions of alimony. Like old
notions of spousal support during marriage, alimony may continue
to be viewed as a reward or privilege rather than as an entitlement.
VI. CHANGES IN PERCEPTIONS AND LEGAL STATUS
OF WOMEN
As early as 1939, a legal theorist could argue that the married
woman had become the social equal and the legal near-equal of her
spouse. 69 At that time, approximately 16% of married women in
the United States worked at income-producing jobs outside their
66. Freed & Foster, Faintly Law in the Fifty States, 18 FAM. L. Q. 369, 379 (1985). South Dakota
adopted a no-fault ground in 1985. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. S25-4-17.2 (Supp. 1985).
67. Act of Mar. 18, 1971, ch. 149, 1971 N.D. Sess. Laws 234 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE S
14-05-03(8) (1981)).
68. Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 44 (N.D. 1977). In Hultberg, the North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's determination that fault was irrelevant to the issue of
property distribution. The court rejected Justice Vogel's dissenting argument that the legislature
intended to eliminate fault in passing the irreconcilable differences statute. Justice Vogel argued that
to continue to consider fault permitted reentry into the courtroom of degredation and mutual
character assassination that the new ground was meant to avoid. See also Hegge v. Hegge, 236
N.W.2d 910, 916 (N.D. 1975) (reversal of alimony to wife guilty of adultery and desertion); Grant v.
Grant, 226 N.W.2d 358, 362-63 (N.D. 1975) (reaffirming NovIesky decision that conduct should be
considered when making a divorce judgment on grounds of irreconcilable differences); Novlesky v.
Novlesky, 206 N.W.2d 865, 868 (N.D. 1973) (adoption of irreconcilable differences ground for
divorce did not eliminate fault as consideration for making property division).
69. Kelso, supra note 59, at 192. Kelso described the changes in perceptions and legal status of
women as follows:
More anciently she was mainly a consort, kept in her husband's home for purposes of
companionship and propagation. Now she has become a social person, quite equal
with her husband, thoughtful of civic and public affairs, concerned with matters
political, interested in the broader things of life. To an increasing degree today she
takes the initiative in family support and family progress.
So completely has she become the coordinate and collaborator with her husband in
family support that the law has gradually, by one step after another, recognized her
parity. Thus, she may now hold property independently of her husband. She may
enter into contractual relations independently of him. She may enter into contracts
directly with him. She may sue him and be sued by him in matters not directly
touching the marriage contract. Though the words of the marriage ceremony still
admonish her to "love, honor and obey" him, she is not obliged to do any one of those
things; and the law is powerless to compel her to do so. She may leave him and sue him
for absolute divorce upon a multiplicity of grounds touching happiness and personal
freedom rather than mere marital faithfulness. She may vote and her secret ballot is
none of his legal concern. From her old position as an identity merged in him and not
separable from him, she has advanced to a position of independence in most respects
fully equal with his.
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homes,70 but most women expected to stop working when they
became wives. 7 By 1940, 27.4% of all American women worked,
and 16.7% of married American women worked. 72 Both rates
began to rise sharply after World War II. By 1974, 46% of all
American women worked, of whom 60% were married. 73 By 1982,
52.1% of the women in the United States, and 51.8% of the
married women, worked outside their homes. 74 While significant
differences remained in the types and successes of female
75
participation as compared to male participation in the labor force,
it was no longer possible to accept the old stereotype of women as
economically unproductive persons "destined solely for the home"
76
while only men labored in the marketplace.
Even the constitutional status of women changed. In 1971, the
United States Supreme Court decided for the first time that the
equal protection clause of the Constitution significantly limits the
power of government to differentiate treatment, entitlements, or
duties on the basis of gender. 77 The constitutional standard that
evolved is that gender-based discriminations must be substantially
related to important state objectives. 78 In 1977, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that state constitutional law requires the more
stringent justification that gender-based differentials be necessary
for compelling state purposes.79
Nine years after the North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned
that alimony was a continuation of marital support, Nick Bingert
argued that his court-ordered obligation to pay alimony was
70. Id. n. 9.
71. G. MASNICK & M. BANE, THE NATION'S FAMILIES: 1960-1990 (1980).
72. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BULL. No. 2096, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 413 (1984).

73. S. ROTHMAN, WOMEN'S PROPER PLACE 229 (1978). In 1967, 57% of all women who worked
were married; this was almost twice the percentage in 1940. K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBERG, & H. KAY,
SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 426 (1974).
74. STATISITICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 72, at 413.

75. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
76. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15(1975).
77. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In two early substantive due process cases, the Court
invalidated gender-based classifications in state minimum wage laws. See Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298
U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). These cases were later
overruled. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
Justice Stevens described Reed as the first intimation by the Court "that the concept of sex
discrimination might have some relevance to equal protection analysis." General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161 n.3 (1977) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
78. Heckler v. Mathews, 104 S.Ct. 1387 (1984); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976). This standard for justifying gender-based discrimination is often called an intermediate
equal protection test, as it is less demanding than the requirement that racial classifications be
necessary for compelling state purposes, but more demanding than the justification of ordinary
classifications by their rational relationship to legitimate goals.
79. State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621,631 (N.D. 1977).
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unconstitutional. 80 Although section 14-05-24 is gender-neutral on
its face, he reasoned that it was discriminatory because it was a
continuation of the marital duty to support and that duty as a
matter of North Dakota statute at that time discriminated on the
basis of gender. The court acknowledged that Nick Bingert had
constructed an "impeccable
syllogism."8'
It rejected his
conclusion, however, because it rejected his first proposition.
Earlier language describing alimony as a continuation of the
marital duty to support was mere dicta, the Bingert court concluded.
Alimony, it declared, is entirely independent of the right to spousal
support during marriage. "We believe," the court added, that
"the trend in modern domestic-relations law is to treat alimony as a
method for rehabilitating the party disadvantaged by the
divorce." ' 82 That observation became the source of later, more
positive affirmations that "the function of alimony" is to
rehabilitate the party disadvantaged by the divorce8 3 and that "is
not a continuation of the right of one spouse to be supported by the
84
other during marriage."
The court correctly recognized the need to replace the old
notion of marital support in order to preserve the constitutionality
of the alimony statute. It may, however, have inadvertently
suggested that alimony had only a single purpose that could be
described by a single model, a model that would not allow postmarital spousal support if a person did not need rehabilitation or
was not capable of being rehabilitated.
VII. POST-MARITAL SUPPORT

A.

REHABILITATIVE POST-MARITAL SUPPORT

Certainly the court was correct in its observation that by 1976
it had become popular to describe post-marital support as a means
of rehabilitation for a disadvantaged spouse. The perception of
80. Bingert v. Bingert, 247 N.W.2d 464 (N.D. 1976). The North Dakota statute defining
spousal liability during marriage is 514-07-03 of the North Dakota Century Code. Section 14-07-03
originally required husbands to support wives by their labor or property but required wives to
support husbands only out of their separate property and only when husbands were unable to
support themselves. N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-07-03 (1981). Section 14-07-03 was made gender-neutral
as of July 1, 1982. It now provides that "the husband and wife have a mutual duty to support each
other out of their individual property and labor." Id.(Supp. 1985).
81. Bingert v. Bingert, 247 N.W.2d 464, 468 (N.D. 1976).
82. Id. at 469.
83. Martin v. Martin, 307 N.W.2d 541, 544 (N.D. 1981);Jochim v. Jochim, 306 N.W.2d 196,
199 (ND. 1981); Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754, 758 (N.D. 1981).
84. Carrv. Carr, 300 N.W.2d 40, 46 (N.D. 1980).
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women as economically productive rather than inherently
dependent necessarily implied that they were capable of financial
self-sufficiency. It therefore followed that, if they had lost or never
gained such autonomy while married, they were entitled to be
rehabilitated when the marriage ended.
Rehabilitative maintenance is awarded to encourage and
require an economically dependent spouse "to develop marketable
skills and obtain employment which will enable her to contribute,
in whole or in part, to her support. "85 Rehabilitative support is
ordinarily awarded for a limited amount of time because of a
reasonable expectation that further training, experience, and
circumstances will enable the recipient to obtain appropriate
86
employment during that period.
There are. actually two different concepts of rehabilitative
maintenance. One, a minimalist doctrine, intends that support for
a short period of time be used to attain financial independence at
any economic level. The premise of minimalist rehabilitation is that
the disadvantage of divorce is the loss to the economically
dependent person of the continuing support of the spouse. Implicit
in the doctrine is a view of marriage as a career, "the loss of which
necessitates, like most other jobs, a period of readjustment and
retraining. "87 It is entirely pragmatic in its concern that a
dependent spouse not remain a permanent responsibility of the
other spouse or of the public. Its purpose is served when the
recipient attains sufficient training, retraining, or experience for
minimal self-sufficiency. It is perhaps more accurate to describe
this kind of support as "transitional;" 88 the dependent spouse who
already has enough training or experience will need support only
85. Frye v. Frye, 386 So. 2d 1383, 1389 (Fla. App. 1980). The court stated that "[t]he purpose
of rehabilitative alimony is to restore to a spouse who, because of the marriage, was either prevented
from becoming or chose not to become self-supporting, those skills which would enable her or him to
support herself or himself." See Note, Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In Need of a More Comprehensive
Ahproach to MitigatingDissolution Trauma, 12 U.S. F.L. REV. 493, 495-96 (1978).
86. McDowell v. McDowell, 670 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). In McDowell, the court
found that:
A limited award of maintenance is not precluded merely because the anticipated event
of the wife's employment has not occurred as of the date of the trial or will become a
certainty only after the wife has sought out and obtained a position. . . . A limited
award of maintenance is an attempt at an appraisal of future events.

Id.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has suggested that "[t]he placement of a specific time when
spousal support payments will cease, rather than a time period uncertain in duration, will more
readily effectuate the rehabilitative purposes ofspousal support." Hedin v. Hedin, 370 N.W.2d 544,
548 (N.D. 1985).
87. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 22, at 149.
88. Id.
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while looking for a job, although a court may award it for an
additional brief period to give her time to "adjust to her new status
and circumstances." 8 9 Transitional support may be appropriate
after even a fairly brief marriage, if circumstances of the marriage
were economically dislocating. 9"
A more equitable concept of rehabilitative support, however,
tries to provide education, training, or experience that will enable
the disadvantaged spouse to obtain "suitable" and "appropriate"
self-support 1 by improving her employment skills. Suitability is in
part determined by the interests and potential skills of the person
needing rehabilitation. 92 The standard of living established by the
parties during their marriage may also be relevant, as it can be
taken as an expression of what needs and levels of consumption
93
they themselves have thought appropriate.
The North Dakota Supreme Court must have had this more
generous concept of equitable rehabilitative support in mind when
it approved the award of $200 a month for thirteen years to enable
Charla Williams to "re-establish herself as a single person" and to
"continue her education to her stated vocational and educational
goals.
The narrower concept could not justify support for such a
",94

89. Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educational Goals:. How the Law Can Ensure
Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 947, 951. See Jochim v. Jochim, 306 N.W.2d 196, 198, 200 (N.D.
1981) (" 'spousal support' for three years to allow wife 'to move into the job market' "); Turner v.
Turner, 158 NJ. Super. 313, 385 A.2d 1280 (1978) (alimony until completion of one full year of
employment). Sometimes forced rehabilitation is postponed in order to enable parents with custody
of young children to remain at home with them, but this pattern may be changing now that it is
considered normal for mothers of young children to work. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 22, at 149,
164-66.
90. E.g., Oviatt v. Oviatt, 355 N.W.2d 825, 828 (N.D. 1984). In Oviatt, the Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's award of $300 a month for eighteen months. Terry Oviatt had moved with
her Air Force husband to North Dakota and then to Oregon during three years of marriage, so it was
"not unreasonable to assume, under the circumstances, that Ithe wife] was having financial difficulty
rehabilitating herself once she reached Oregon." Id. Cf. Wiltsey v. Wiltsey, 357 N.W.2d 400, 401-02
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (trial court did not abuse discretion in awarding $500 a month maintenance
based on a "finding that [the wife] had the ability to find employment but needed assistance, because
she had been out of thejob market for four years").
91. E.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308.
92. See McDowell v. McDowell, 670 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Mo. App. 1984). In AMcDowell, the wife
had ai master's degree in education, certification, and six years experience teaching. She had not
been working outside the home while caring for children, but that responsibility ended when custody
was awarded to the husband. She received marital property valued at $120,000. Id. The court found
that "[iin this situation, it was not unreasonable to anticipate an assumption by the wife of her own
financial responsibility within a period of two years, aided by maintenance of $1000.00 per month
duringthe period." See also Childers v. Childers, 15 Wash. App. 792, 552 P.2d 83, 84, 86 (1976).
93. Note, supra note 85, at 502. Minnesota supports the view that the standard of living
established by the parties during their marriage is relevant in awarding rehabilitative support. This
view is reflected in its statutory requirement that a recipient of maintenance be "unable to provide
adequate self-support, after considering the standard of living established during the marriage and
all relevant circumstances, through appropriate employment .... " MItNN. STAT. § 518.552(1)(b)
(Supp. 1985). "Appropriate" employment is determined by comparing actual income to monthly
expenses. Robinson v. Robinson, 355 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Erlandson v.
Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Minn. 1982).
94. Williams v. Williams, 302 N.W.2d 754, 758 (N.D. 1981).
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long time to a recipient who was already working full time as a
secretary .95
Certainly it was an equitable concept of maintenance for
rehabilitation beyond minimal self-sufficiency that the court
approved in Smith v. Smith:
Peggy Smith is young and capable and she desires to go to
college to learn a profession to help herself become better
able to support herself and the four children in her
custody. Peggy has chosen an area of training, speech
pathology, that she can also use to help her child who has
a speech impediment. . . .Peggy's desire to go back to
school to acquire the necessary education for financial
independence is commendable. Tom, as well as Peggy
and the children, will be benefitted as a result of Peggy's
rehabilitation because in four years she will be better able
to share in the burden of supporting four minor
children .96
Equitable rehabilitation, beyond minimal self-sufficiency, is
intended to mitigate a marital disadvantage that is perceived as
having been caused not so much by the fact of divorce as by the
impact at divorce of an economic role assumed during marriage.
That economic role may not have left one spouse totally incapable
of self-support, but has left him or her in a less advantageous
position as a wage earner than that person would have been in had
there been no marriage. At this time in our culture, the
economically disadvantaged party is usually the wife, because she
gave up opportunities for education or training, left or never
entered the labor force in order to be a full-time homemaker, or
because she worked outside the home but in a casual, interrupted,
or non-career capacity in deference to a dominant career role for
the husband or in order to ,accommodate her other family
responsibilities. 97 Rehabilitative maintenance that recognizes such
95. Id. at 756.
96. Smith v. Smith, 326 N.W.2d 697, 700 (N.D. 1982). After an eleven year marriage during
which the wife had worked while the husband went to college and the wife's father had provided the
couple with considerable financial support, the trial court awarded child support of $100 per month
per child and alimony of $100 per month for thirty months. Id. at 699-700. The husband's gross
earnings were from $2,200 to $2,300 a month. Id. at 701. The supreme court raised child support to
$150 per month and changed the alimony award to $200 per month for four years. Id. at 700. See also
Moran v. Moran, 200 N.W.2d 263 (N.D. 1975) (alimony to enable wife to obtain doctorate so that
she could teach at college level).
97. E.g., Hedin v. Hedin, 370 N.W.2d 544, 548 (N.D. 1985).,"Mavis was clearly the party
disadvantaged by the divorce. Having been a full-time homemaker for most of the [28 year]
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opportunity costs is designed to make possible the further
education, training, or experience that might place the
disadvantaged spouse in the position she could have been in if it
were not for the marriage, or at least to mitigate the loss of career
opportunities and development during marriage.
Sometimes it is apparent at the time of divorce that the
economically dependent spouse cannot be rehabilitated even in the
narrow sense of achieving minimal self-sufficiency. 98 Less
infrequently, it is obvious at the time of divorce that the
spouse cannot be equitably
economically disadvantaged
rehabilitated to make up for the opportunities and development she
lost in the course of the marriage. Most recent reported North
Dakota cases upholding awards of spousal support involved
middle-aged wives with limited educations who worked primarily,
if not exclusively, as homemakers during marriages of more than
twenty years duration and who, irrespective of their innate abilities
and good faith efforts to rehabilitate themselves, had no realistic
prospect of developing significant earning capacities. 99 The North
marriage, Mavis has not had the opportunity to prepare herself to compete in the employment
market, and is now on her own, without the benefit ofJerome's earning ability." Id.
Historically, participation of married women in the labor market has often been interrupted,
pars-time, or marginal. Masnick & Bane, supra note 71, at 70-76. Participation of married women,
especially those with children, has sharply risen, but working wives and mothers "continue to adjust
their work lives to the demands of home and children." Id. at 70, 82. ,
For the last 25 years, women working full-time outside the home have earned, on average, 60%
of men's full-time earnings. While this disparity is caused in part by the segregation of women in
low-paying jobs, it is also caused by discontinuity of married women's participation in the workforce.
Note, Equal Pay, Comparable Work, andjob Evaluation, 90 YALE L.J. 657, 659 & n. 17 (1981).
98. E.g., Haberstroh v. Haberstroh, 258 N.W.2d 669 (N.D. 1977) (wife incapacitated by
serious alcohol and psychiatric problems).
99. E.g., Briese v. Briese, 325 N.W.2d 245 (N.D. 1982) (wife of 31 year marriage had high
school education and worked in only occasional and part-time employment outside home); Mees v.
Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1982) (wife of 34 year marriage with back condition had only high
school education and had worked as sales clerk for 10 years); Gooselaw v. Gooselaw, 320 N.W.2d
490 (N.D. 1982) (high school graduate wife of 23 year marriage had work experience only within
family-owned business); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 284 N.W.2d 576 (N.D. 1979) (wife of 22 year
marriage worked outside home on only a few occasions and had little training in any field). But see
Hedin v. Hedin, 370 N.W.2d 544, 548 (N.D. 1985) (record did not support conclusion that 50 year
old high school graduate was incapable of rehabilitation after being a full-time homemaker during
most of 28 year marriage). Maintenance for such "displaced homemakers" has been characterized
as "disability insurance for women with earning disabilities." Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 22, at
149. Minnesota by statute directs a court determining maintenance to consider "[t]he duration of the
marriage and, in the case of a homemaker, the length of absence from employment and the extent to
which any education, skills, or experience have become outmoded and earning capacity has become
permanently diminished." MINN. STAT. S 518.552(2)(d)(Supp. 1985).
See Note, supra note 85, at 501. The author states that "no case or statutory law distinguishes, in
terms of years, between a short-term, middle-term, or long-term marriage." Id. In appropriate
circumstances, a court may award rehabilitative alimony after a relatively short marriage. See supra
note 90 and accompanying text. Duration, however, is an important element in quantifying both the
need for rehabilitation and the entitlement to share marital assets. For an example of a divorce after
marriage of short duration where the North Dakota Supreme Court approved the lower court's
attempt to restore the status quo ante, see Mattis v. Mattis, 274 N.W.2d 201, 206 (N.D. 1979).
Although a trial court must ordinarily consider all jointly and individually owned property in order
to determine the net worth of marital property, after a six year second marriage between the same
two parties failed, the Supreme Court permitted the exclusion from consideration of property owned
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Dakota Supreme Court has recognized that, while spousal support
should be for rehabilitative purposes if rehabilitation is possible, 100
spousal support may serve an additional or alternative purpose of
permanent maintenance. While it has recognized that function,
however, the court has not always articulated the rationale for such
an entitlement.
B.

COMPENSATORY POST-MARITAL SUPPORT

Understanding marriage as a shared enterprise within which
spouses may play different but equally valuable economic roles
makes the sharing of property by equitable redistribution at divorce
At the termination of many contemporary
acceptable.'10
marriages, however, there is relatively little tangible property to be
shared.10 2 Often the most significant asset developed during the
course of a marriage is the earning capacity of one or both of the
/
spouses.
In many divorce cases, the earning capacity of one spouse is
the single significant asset of the marriage, and the disadvantaged
spouse can only be compensated by future payments from the
other. An interesting problem is posed when one spouse earns a
professional degree and, at the time of divorce, has just begun a
predictably lucrative career. In such situations it is widely
perceived "that concepts of fairness and equity require that the
supporting spouse be compensated when the student spouse leaves
the marriage with an earning capacity substantially increased
through the other spouse's efforts and sacrifices and the supporting
spouse leaves the marriage with little property and a lower earning
capacity than the student spouse.' 0 3 This is so even though there
is usually no justification for rehabilitative support. 0 4 Most
by the husband at the time of remarriage. Linn v. Linn, 370 N.W.2d 536, 539, 541 n. 3 (N.D. 1985).
Contrast the court's discomfort with an attempt to award to a husband property he brought into a
marriage and inherited, which amounted to 80% of the parties' net worth, after a 22 year marriage.
Sventenko v. Sventenko, 306 N.W.2d 607 (N.D. 1981).
100. Smith v. Smith, 326 N.W.2d 697, 700 (N.D. 1982) (purpose of spousal support is to
rehabilitate when possible).
101. E.g., Comment, supra note 18; Mahoney, supra note 53. Cf Fischer v. Fischer, 349 N.W.2d
22, 24 (N.D. 1984) (court stated that marriage is a partnership).
102. E.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SENES P-23, No. 112, CHILD
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY (1978). The report states that "[1less than one-half of the 12 million women
who had ever been divorced as of Spring 1979 received some form of property settlement. Id. The
median value of property settlements reported by women who received a settlement and were
divorced between 1975 and 1979 was $4,650." Id.
103. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N .W.2d 796, 805-06 (1984).
104. There is typically no role for minimalist rehabilitation in these cases, as the supporting
spouse has been working and supporting the other spouse as well as herself while he finished his
education. There is often nojustification for the broader concept of equitable rehabilitative alimony,
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jurisdictions refuse to characterize a professional degree as property
subject to equitable distribution. 10 5 However, a majority of
jurisdictions addressing this problem have accepted one or more
rationales for compensating or reimbursing the contributions to the
enhanced earning capacity of the student spouse by the spouse with
the lower earning capacity. 10 6 Such cases may be distinguished
from those involving marriages of substantial duration that leave
the spouses with a substantial disparity in earning capacities. In
longer marriages there has been some shared return on the marital
investment in the enhanced earning capacity of the economically
dominant spouse. That distinction becomes less compelling,
however, with the recognition that few marriages produce enough
tangible property to permit the parties comparable standards of
living after divorce. Thus, the spouse with the significantly larger
earning capacity will be in a dramatically different position than the
other spouse unless there is some compensatory adjustment.
The attention in contemporary cases to the allocation of
retirement and pension benefits, a traditional means of deferring
returns on earning capacities, also illustrates the importance of
earning capacities. Typically, courts award to one spouse a share of
the other's anticipated pension, adjusted to the proportion of
as the supporting spouse has not interrupted her career but instead has continued with incomeproducing work as she would have if unmarried.
105. The leading case rejecting characterization of a professional degree as property is In re
-, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). In Graham, the court stated as
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429,
follows:
[An educational degree] does not have an exchange value or any objective value
transferable on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on death of
the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or
pledged... it has none of the atributes of property in the usual sense of that term.
Id. A few courts do treat a degree as a property asset, however, reasoning that "whether or not an
advanced degree can physically or metaphysically be defined as 'property' is beside the point."
Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 263, 337 N.W.2d 332, 335 (1983). Of 23
jurisdictions that have considered the question, 16 have held that an educational degree is not
property and 4 have declined to resolve the issue. Weinstein v. Weinstein, 128 11. App. 3d 234, 470
N.E.2d 551, 555-56 (1984) (by its holding became the seventeenth court to reject concept of degree as
property).
106. Justice Abrahamson explains four permissible approaches to reimbursing or compensating
the contributing spouse in Haugan v. Haugan. The first is the cost value appoach, which may
reimburse the fair value of homemaker services as well as money contributed to family support and
educational costs minus the supporting spouse's living expenses and the student spouse's
343 N.W.2d 796, 802 (1984). Seee.g.,
contributions. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.2d 200, -,
DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981). The narrowest approach to
reimbursement of costs is codified in the Indiana statute that provides "[w~hen the court finds that
there is little or no marital property, it may award either spouse a money judgment not limited to the
property existing at the time of final separation. However, this award may be made only for the
financial contribution of one spouse toward tuition, books, and laboratory fees for the higher
education of the other spouse." IND. ConE § 31-1-11.5-11 (d) (Supp. 1984). The second method is the
opportunity costs approach, which calculates the income the family sacrificed because the student
, 343
spouse attended school instead of being employed. Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis.2d at __
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retirement benefit that accumulated during the marriage. 10 7 An
increasing number of states, including North Dakota,' 0 8 have
recognized spousal interests at the time of divorce in unvested as
well as vested pension benefits of the other spouse. 109
Given the importance of future returns on productivity, it is
not surprising that the North Dakota Supreme Court often treats
disparities between the earning capacities of former spouses as
particularly significant.110 A spouse with an underdeveloped
N.W.2d at 803. The third approach is the calculation of the present value of the student spouse's
enhanced earning capacity. Id. This approach, which recognizes the lost expectation of a return on
the investment in the student spouse's earning capacity, is often criticized as too speculative because
of unforeseen variables that may affect future earnings. The last approach is a labor theory of value,
which considers the value of the supporting spouse's contribution at one half of the student spouse's
enhanced yearly earning power for as many years as the supporting spouse worked to support the
student spouse. Id. This approach is analogous to the fixed percentage method for dividing future
pension benefits. See infra note 107.
107. In Taylor v. Taylor, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that retirement benefits may be
divided at the time of divorce by awarding the present cash value equal to a portion of the present
value of the benefits, and that this method is preferred when there are sufficient assets to permit an
equalizing award without hardship to either party and when calculation of present benefits is not
unduly speculative. Taylor v. Taylor, 329 N.W.2d 795, 798-99 (Minn. 1983). When there are not
sufficient assets to equitably require that benefits due in the future be split presently, Or when present
evaluation is unacceptably speculative, the court must determine a fixed percentage method for
dividing future payments when they are paid to the employee. Id. at 799 (citing Holbrook v.
Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)). In Janssen v. Janssen, the
Minnesota Supreme Court endorsed a formula for determining the percentages to be shared. Janssen
v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn. 1983). The formula comprises a fraction, the numerator of
which is the number of years of marriage that benefits were accumulated, and the denominator of
which is the total number of years that benefits were accumulated prior to being paid. Id. (citing In re
Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 663, 397 N.E.2d 511, 519 (1979)). See also Kottke v. Kottke,
353 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
108. Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904 (N.D. 1984); Lentz v. Lentz, 353 N.W.2d 742 (N.D.
1984); Glass v. Glass, 344 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1984). The court recently held that the trial court's
conclusion that it could not consider an unvested military pension in property distribution was an
erroneous view of the law. Delorey v. Delorey, 357 N.W.2d 488, 490 (N.D. 1984). It has twice
upheld awards of percentages reached by theJanssen formula. See Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d
904, 909-10 (ND. 1984); Lentz v. Lentz, 353 N.W.2d 742, 743 (N.D. 1984). For an explanation of'
the Janssen formula, see supra note 107. The court in Lentz quoted with apparent approval the
Minnesota position that division of the present cash value of retirement benefits is preferred to a
future payment of a fixed percentage when there are sufficient assets available to divide the present
value without undue hardship and when the present value is not unduly speculative. Lentz v. Lentz,
353 N.W.2d 742, 747 n.2 (N.D. 1984).
109. But cf. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981) (federal statute insulates military
retirement benefits from distribution as property in divorce proceedings). Shortly after the McCarty
case was decided, Congress made the disposition of military retirement benefits at divorce a matter
of state law. Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730
(1982) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982)). Section 1408 (d) (2) of title 10 of the United States Code
provides that payments may not be made under the Act unless the marriage was for at least 10 years.
10 U.S.C. S 1408 (d) (2) (1982). This has been interpreted to limit direct payments to a former
spouse from the pension account of a retired military person but not otherwise to limit a court's
power to treat military pensions as divisible property. In re Wood, 676 P.2d 338 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
Similarly, section 1408(e)(1) of title 10 limits direct government payments to former spouses to 50%
of the disposable retired pay but does not limit court authority to treat all of the benefit as marital
property. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1) (1982); Deliduka v. Deliduka, 347 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984). The North Dakota Supreme Court recently avoided a contrary interpretation of section
1408(e)(1). See Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904, 908-09 (N.D. 1984).
Minnesota by statute characterizes vested pension benefits as marital property. See MINN. STAT.
5 518.54(5) (Supp. 1985). Minnesota courts, however, may divide future unvested as well as vested
pension benefits in a property division or as an award of maintenance. See Taylor v. Taylor, 329
N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1983); Faus v. Faus, 319 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. 1982).
110. E.g., Weir v. Weir, 374 N.W.2d 858 (N.D. 1985); Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207 (N.D.
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earning capacity who leaves a marriage of substantial duration" '
has a stake in the career development and potential of the primary
income-producer, because the career capacities of both spouses and
the standards of living that those capacities make possible are a part
of the aggregate tangible and intangible assets and liabilities for
which both spouses share responsibility. That conclusion is simply
another dimension of the recognition that marriage is a joint
enterprise to which both spouses contribute in a variety of ways and
11 2
for which both accept and share fiscal consequences.
Sometimes disparities between earning capacities can be
mitigated by awards of income-producing property. t 3 Sometimes
the spouse with an underdeveloped earning capacity can be
rehabilitated. 114 When neither of those means of mitigating
1982) (husband had net pay of $1,350.00 per month and wife had net pay of $525.00 a month). In a
puzzling case in which the recipient of spousal support had been rehabilitated and had achieved an
earning capacity comparable to her former husband's, the court suggested that the payments might
be a property division. Lipp v. Lipp, 355 N.W.2d 817, 820 (N.D. 1984).
111. In shorter marriages, it is less likely that spouses with a subordinate economic role will be
permanently disadvantaged. Furthermore, one spouse's interest in the other's income capacity is
proportionate to the length of the marriage, as is reflected in allocations of pensions. See supra note 99.
112. For an analysis of one spouse's contribution to the future productivity of the other spouse
as an economic investment in human capital, see Krauskopf, supra note 63, at 381-93.
113. E.g., Tuff v. Tuff, 333 N.W.2d 421, 424 (N.D. 1983) (concern that all income-producing
assets went to husband, and that wife cannot convert installment payments to income-producing
property). Ordinarily property redistribution is the preferred means of equitable division because it
avoids continuing enforcement problems. Equitable compensation by means of property distribution
does have one major disadvantage, however, which is the risk of bankruptcy. See Trentadue, supra
note 27, at _.
114. In two recent cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that when, after a long marriage, a
wife's earning capacity after rehabilitation would be less than 20% of her husband's, maintenance
should be rehabilitative rather than permanent. McClelland v. McClelland, 359 N.W.2d 7, 9-10
(Minn. 1984); Abuzzahab v Abuzzahab, 359 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Minn. 1984) (en banc). In McClelland,
the husband had a gross annual income of $230,000. The wife's college chemistry education was
outmoded but after two to four years of computer training following her twenty year marriage, she
planned to seek employment in business or as a stock analyst. McClelland, 359 N.W.2d at 9-10. In
Abuzzahab, the husband was a board-certified psychiatrist engaged in the practice of psychiatry and
pharmacology whose annual income was $215,473. Abuzzahab, 359 N.W.2d at 18. The wife, a former
nurse who had not worked outside the home during the twenty-two year marriage, was enrolled in a
real estate sales course and intended to obtain a real estate license. Id. at 14. The trial court found
that her maximum earning capacity would be $18,000 to $22,000 per year. Id. There were strong
dissents to both decisions, arguing that the trial court awards of permanent maintenance should be
upheld. McClelland, 359 N.W.2d at 11 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part); Abuzzahab,
359 N.W.2d at 14 (Wahl,J., dissenting).
The Minnesota legislature responded to the controvery occassioned by McClellandandAbuzzahad
by amending the Minnesota maintenance statute as follows:
518.552 MAINTENANCE.
Subdivision 1. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, or
in a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of the marriage by a court which
lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse and which has since acquired
jurisdiction, the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse if it finds that
the spouse seeking maintenance:
(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to the
spouse, to provide for reasonable needs of the spouse considering the standard of living
established during the marriage, especially, but not limited to, a period of training or
education, or
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significant disparities in spousal earning capacities is possible,
however, compensatory post-marital support, instead of or in
addition to rehabilitative maintenance, is appropriate.II5
With a new awareness of the value of indirect and intangible
contributions by homemakers comes a sharper understanding that
both spouses, as contributors, invest their time and efforts in the
development of the earning capacity of their marital unit as well as
in the tangible marital property accumulated. That understanding
supports the notion implicit in many opinions that when a marriage
of substantial duration fails, its earning capacity as a marital unit
should be shared in the sense of permitting both spouses to function
as single persons with comparable standards of living. If separate
standards cannot be maintained at the level achieved by the marital
(b) is unable to provide adequate self-support, after considering the standard of
living established during the marriage and all relevant circumstances, through
appropriate employment, or is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek
employment outside the home.
Subd. 2. The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time,
either temporary or permanent, as .he court deems just, without regard to marital
misconduct, and after considering all r(levant factors including:
(a) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to the party, and the party's ability to meet his or her needs
independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living
with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(b) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
party seeking maintenance to find appropriate -mployment, and the probability,
given the party's age and skills, of completing ed-.cation or training and becoming
fully or partially self-supporting;
(c) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(d) the duration of the marriage and, ,in the case of a homemaker, the length of
absence from employment and the extent to which any education, skills, or experience
have become outmoded and earning capacity has become permanently diminished;
(e) the loss of earnings, seniority, retire .%xent benefits, and other. employment
opportunities foregone by the spouse seeking spousal maintenance;
(f) the age, and physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking
maintenance;
(g) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs
while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance; and
(h) the contribution of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation,
or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property, as well as the
contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or in furtherance of the other party's
employment or business.
Subd. 3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to favor a temporary award of
maintenance over a permanent award, where the factors under subdivision 2 justify a
permanent award.
Where there is some uncertainty as to the necessity of a permanent award, the
court shall order a permanent award leaving its order open for later modification.

S 518.552 (Supp. 1985).
115. E.g., Kulakowski v. Kulakowski, Ch. Div. 1982). The court stated as follows:
MINN. STAT.

N.J. Super. -,

468 A.2d 733, 734 (N.J. Super.

[Cllearly, when a woman has been a homemaker for many years and is compelled
to obtain employment in the marketplace, she is often unable to earn sufficient income
to enable her to maintain the same style of living to which she became accustomed
during coverture when she had access to the income of her husband. No matter how
many courses she takes or how much experience she acquires, her earnings often will
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1 6
it follows that the reduction Should be shared rather than
unit,"

avoided by the spouse whose earning capacity was developed and
enhanced during the course of the marriage." 7 A significant
disparity in the earning capacities of former spouses who made
comparable contributions to their marriage must be compensated if
the spouse with the smaller capacity is to benefit equitably from
their shared efforts. 118
The Bullock case provides an example of spousal support for an
be insufficient to enable her to do so. Following a divorce after a lengthy marriage she
simply does not possess the skills, business contacts and confidence needed to earn a
salary comparable to that of her husband, who had the opportunity and time during
coverture to develop these talents. Under these circumstances it would be unfair and
unjust to compel her at the conclusion of a rehabilitative period to live solely from her
earnings, while the husband enjoys the full fruits of the talents he acquired, in
substantial part, during the marriage. For these reasons both rehabilitative and
permanent alimony may, where appropriate, be awarded.
• . . Clearly, it would be grossly unfair and inequitable to compel her to live a
reduced lifestyle commensurate with her anticipated limited earnings, while her
husband is permitted to enjoy a substantially enhanced style of living due, in part, to
increased income resulting from the skills, business contacts and confidence he
acquired during their marriage while she was caring for his home and children.
Id. at __, 468 A.2d at 734.
116. E.g., Sventenko v. Sventenko, 306 N.W.2d 607, 612 (N.D. 1981). Unless substantial
resources are available, separate living standards cannot duplicate the single standard available
before divorce. One study concluded that usually purchasing power after divorce is less than half
what it was before divorce. White & Stone, A Study of Alimony and Child Support: Rulings with Some
Recommendations, 10 FAM. L. Q. 75 (1976). See also Erickson, supra note 89, at 947. The author states
that "[bjecause the old adage two can live more cheaply than one contains an element of truth,
even the most equitable system of law would usually leave both parties at a lower standard of living
than that they enjoyed during the marriage." Id.
117. In re Grove, 280 Or. 341,
-, 571 P.2d 477, 485 (1977). In Grove, the court stated as
follows:
We will not ignore the fact that, at least until recent years, young women entering
marriage were led to believe - if not expressly by their husbands-to-be, certainly
implicity by the entire culture in which they had come to maturity - that they need
not develop any special skills or abilities beyond those necessary to homemaking and
child care, because their husbands, if they married, would provide their financial
support and security. We cannot hold that women who relied on that assurance,
regardless of whether they sacrificed any specific career plans of their own when they
married, must as a matter of principle be limited to the standard of living they can
provide for themselves if "employed at a job commensurate with [their] skills and
abilities." The marriage itself may well have prevented the development of those skills
and abilities.
Id. at

, 571 P.2d at 485.
118. J. AREEN, supra note 31, at 631 (1975) (study of 5,000 American families found wives and
children twelve times as likely to be on welfare if separated or divorced, while husbands experience
an average increase in spendable income after divorce); Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 22, at 173-78
(extensive California data shows striking discrepancies in disposable income available to men and
women after long marriages in which husband builds career and income-producing capacity while
wife is homemaker; on average, husbands are left with two-thirds to three-quarters of total income
available after divorce); Brief for Appellant at 12, Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487 (N.D.
1978). Appellant-wife argued as follows:
[H]usband can still do his thing and earn the money that he dio betore. Wile,
however, has no experience in her profession, if she ever even trained for one, and,
after 20 years or more of marriage, she will be of the age where there are few jobs into
which she can step and begin to make a comparable income. ...
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economically disadvantaged spouse who might not be equitably
rehabilitated to make up for the opportunities and development she
lost in the course of the marriage. The trial court awarded Patricia
Bullock $1,200 per month after seventeen years of marriage and
frequent relocations occasioned by the military assignments of her
husband. 11 9 The North Dakota Supreme Court found substantial
evidence that Patricia Bullock had significantly contributed to her
husband's career and enhanced earning capacity.1 20 The trial judge
had noted that Patricia Bullock would have to return to school to
obtain active teaching certification, that the job market for teachers
was presently limited, and that she could now be an established
teacher if she had not been a military spouse.1 2 1 The supreme court
concluded that "[t]he court could very reasonably have concluded
that rehabilitation beyond Patricia's present earning capacity was
not likely in the near future. In the meantime, the disparity in the
1 22
earning capacities of the parties justifies the award of alimony."
A similar rationale underlies the case in which the North
Dakota Supreme Court noted that Sharon Nastrom, although still
young enough to train for an occupation or profession, would never
be able to develop an earning capacity comparable to that of her
former husband. 123 The court held that the inevitable difference in
the earning capacities of the spouses justified post-marital support
for her in the amount of $1,000 per month. The support, together
with "careful budgeting" and the real property and cash that she
received as her share of the property redistribution, would allow
her to maintain the standard of living developed within the marital
unit. 124
Looking back to Nastrom and Bullock, the court explained the
Id. See also McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352, 355 (Fla. App. 1977) (failure to compensate
disparity would require "society to reclassify the traditional all-American concept of Mom and apple
pie and re-label it a most hazardous occupation that all young girls should be dissuaded from.").
119. Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904, 906 (N.D. 1984). Support was awarded to continue
until the death of the recipient but subject to continued jurisdiction and possible alteration "based
upon the financial position of the parties." Id. For further discussion of the Bullock decision see infta
notes 148, 150,.and 152.
120. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d at 910. The court stated: "The record indicates that Patricia was
primarily responsible for providing care for the children and managing the household through
frequent change-of-station moves and separations unique to life in the military. She also provided
economic support by working outside the home at various times during the marriage." Id.
121. Id. at 911.
122. Id.
123. Nastrom v. Nastrom, 284 N.W.2d 576, 581 (N.D. 1979).
124. Id. at 582. Ned Nastrom would be able to maintain the standard of living developed within
the marital unit, as he received by property division all the business assets that provided the basis for
his income and considerable fringe benefits. See id. at 583.
The supreme court also approved post-divorce support of $600 per month to Delores Gooselaw
so that she might "continue her present style of living." Gooselaw v. Gooselaw, 320 N.W.2d 490,
493 (N.D. 1982). The court observed that "[in light of Delores'.age, limited education, work
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reason for post-marital support entitlements in a case in which it
approved spousal support to be paid to Rebecca Weir in the
amount of $1,300 per month for 1985, $1,600 per month for 1986
through 1989, and $1,500 per month for the remainder of a period
of twenty years or until she remarried. 125 Rebecca Weir, who had
not been employed in a non-interrupted or career capacity during
her marriage, was currently working for a master's degree in
addiction counseling. 126 The North Dakota Supreme Court noted
that her degree might "enable her to achieve some measure of selfsupport" but that it was unlikely that she could
be rehabilitated to the extent that she will attain an
earning capacity comparable to that of her husband. Nor
do there exist substantial marital assets that are presently
divisible which might otherwise provide comparable
resources to the parties.
After a marriage of substantial duration - twentythree years - Rebecca is now on her own without the
benefit of Patrick's proven earning ability, and without
sufficient property and a comparable earning ability
sufficient to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage. We have recognized that in many
cases, when the property is divided between the parties, it
is not sufficient to maintain each of the parties at the same
standard of living after the dissolution of the marriage as
each enjoyed during the marriage. Svetenko v. Svetenko, 306
N.W.2d 607, 612 (N.D. 1981). The awarding of spousal
support in this case is an attempt to provide an equitable
sharingof the overall reduction in the parties' separatestandards of
living, and properly recognizes Rebecca's role in
contributing to Patrick's earning capacity which was
developed and enhanced during the course of the
marriage....
experience mainly within the family-owned business, and the job market generally. . . it is not
unreasonable that the court may have concluded... that rehabilitation beyond her present earning
capacity is not likely." Id. In similar circumstances, the court approved spousal support as well as an
approximately equal property division for Florence Briese. Briese v. Briese, 325 N.W.2d 245, 249
(N.D.1982).
125. Weir v. Weir, 374 N.W.2d 858 (N.D. 1985). Rebecca Weir was also awarded a property
interest in her husband's law firm, office building, and pension, to be determined by Y2 of the 17 Y
years the parties lived together as husband and wife while he worked for his law firm, divided by the
total number of years benefits were accumulated prior to being paid, with total payments reduced by
Y2 of the parties' outstanding indebtedness. Id. at 861. If payments of the property interests
commenced while spousal support was still payable, the amount of spousal support was to be reduced
on a pro rata basis by the amount of those payments. Id. at 862.
126. Id. at 859.
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In our view, the fact that Rebecca is capable of
rehabilitation should not in itself deprive her of
reasonable spousal support in light of the fact that she is
likely to have a much lower income producing capacity
than Patrick, which earning capacity she aided Patrick in
obtaining through her contribution as the homemaker. 2 7
The purpose of post-marital support to effect an equitable
sharing of the income-productive capacity achieved by a marital
unit or of the reduced standards of living occassioned by divorce is,
like the purpose of equitable property redistribution, compensatory
in the retrospective sense that a court looks to and divides assets
and liabilities at the point of divorce. Both spousal support and
property distribution are also forward-looking in the sense that
courts are concerned with the relative capacities of the former
spouses to function economically and to enjoy comparable returns
on their investments in the marital partnership. This rationale
requires post-marital fiscal allocations that serve the dual function
of recognizing the contributions of the permanently disadvantaged
recipient and at the same time recompensing that person for loss of
investment in the earning capacity of the marital unit. This loss of
investment is the intangible asset of the marriage to which both
parties have contributed but which only one party can retain when
there is no realistic prospect that the disadvantaged spouse can be
rehabilitated by attaining a comparable economic capacity.
Despite their functional similarities, however, post-marital
support as a compensatory entitlement should not be confused with
awards of property. The North Dakota Supreme Court has twice
expressly refused to recognize a divisible property interest in
earning capacity or potential future earnings. 12 8 The court has
explained that earning capacity is simply too tenuous to be treated
as a property right:
It would be unjust to order the distribution of what is, at
best, an expectancy, where that order would not be
subject to modification should the expectancy fail to
materialize. When the nature of the interest is such that
the court must maintain its jurisdiction, distribution of
127. Id. at 864 (emphasis in original).
128. See Jondahl v. Jondahl, 344 N.W.2d 63, 70 (N.D, 1984); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262
N.W.2d 487, 493 (N.D. 1978).
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The court has also emphasized that earning capacity is a
proper consideration in determining spousal support. 3 0 Given the
fact that the refusal of courts to treat earning capacity as an asset
subject to property distribution is based on the uncertainty of
receiving the expected returns, it becomes clear why defining
spousal support in terms of its modifiability is useful. Maintenance,
unlike property redistribution, is forward-looking with respect to
the means by which it seeks to reduce disparities in the resources
available to former spouses. Because it looks to expected returns
from the earning capacity developed by the spouse who took the
primary economic role within the marriage, and because such
future income cannot be certain, it is important to permit reduction
of spousal support if the return on the investment that both spouses
made in the earning capacity of one spouse turns out to be less than
was projected at the time of divorce. The fact that modification of
spousal support is a desirable incident of post-marital support for
compensatory purposes, however, does not mean that other
doctrines ancillary to the old notion of alimony as a continuation of
marital support should not be reexamined.
VIII. FACTORS AFFECTING POST-MARITAL SUPPORT
A. FAULT
States are divided as to whether fault remains relevant to postmarital fiscal allocations incident to no-fault divorce.' 3' The North
Dakota Supreme Court construes the statute permitting divorce
upon a showing of irreconcilable differences as not eliminating
consideration of fault in determining property distribution 13 2 and
as not changing the fact that, "[e]ven though section 14-05-24 [of
the North Dakota Century Code] does not mention fault or
misconduct of the parties as being significant, case law or common
law of this State does consider fault or misconduct as significant and
129. jondahl v. Jondahl, 344 N.W.2d 63, 70 (N.D.1984) (quoting Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262
N W.2d 487, 493 (N.D. 1978)). The court has repeated that goodwill ofa business, as distinguisned
from earning capacity, is a property interest. Gooselaw v. Gooselaw, 320 N.W.2d 490, 492 (N.D.
1982); Fraase v. Fraase, 315 N.W.2d 271, 275 (N.D. 1982).
130. Jondahl v.Jondahl, 344 N.W.2d 63, 71 (N.D. 1984); Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d
487, 493 (N.D. 1978).
131. Freed & Foster, supra note 66, at 394-969.
132. Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 44 (N.D. 1977).
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important on the question of alimony. ",133 The court has rejected
arguments that such a construction reintroduces to the courtroom
the bitter competitiveness and mutually destructive charges that the
legislature intended to eliminate by providing a no-fault ground for
divorce. 134
Continued consideration of fault in post-marital support
determinations exaggerates the fiscal consequences of a necessarily
subjective evaluation of comparative responsibility for failed
marriages. 13 5 Consequences of considering fault in contemporary
North Dakota cases range from reversal of an award of
rehabilitative support to an adulterous wife 36 to acceptance of a
trial court's inability to determine who was at fault when an
alcoholic husband had sexually molested two of his children and
kicked his allegedly paranoid and hypochondriac wife. 137 An award
of less than ten percent of property was upheld for a depressive
neurotic wife who did not contribute to property or income
accumulation during the last three years of a nineteen-year
marriage.' 38 In the same volume of reported opinions, the court
reversed as clearly erroneous because insufficient an award of
almost twenty percent of total property to an alcoholic father who
abused his family over the years and whose ability to stay sober was
"by no means a certainty. "1139
In a recent case, the court suggested that fault may be a more
important consideration when the recipient of spousal support
rather than the payor is the party at fault. 140 While it is not clear in
133. Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1975).
134. Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 46-47 (N.D. 1977) (Vogel, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). For other arguments against retention of fault, see Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262
N.W.2d 487, 494 (N.D. 1978) (Vogel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hegge v.
Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910, 919-20 (N.D. 1975) (Vogel, J., dissenting); Novlesky v. Novlesky, 206
N.W.2d 865, 870-71 (N.D. 1973) (Teigen, J., concurring specially).
135. For striking differences in judicial responses to fault, compare the majority opinion with the
dissent in Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1975).
136. Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910, 918-19 (N.D. 1975).
137. Rust v. Rust, 321 N.W.2d 504, 506-07 (N.D. 1982). The trial court explained as follows:
It is impossible for this Court to determine the percentage of fault attributable to one
or the other or which party's conduct precipitated the fault of the other. The fault of
the Defendant in molesting the children is too old to be seriously considered in that it
happened many years ago. . . . Defendant's excessive use of alcoholic beverages
during the marriage can be considered as a disease. This Court in its discretion
believes that in the interest ofjustice it should not be under the facts in this case used as
a factor to cause unequal distribution of the marital assets. Similarly the conduct of
Defendant in kicking the Plaintiff or expressing desires that she were dead are
attributable to his drinking....

Id. at 506.
138. Haberstroh v. Haberstroh, 258 N.W.2d 669, 673 (N.D. 1977).
139. Haugeberg v. Haugeberg, 258 N.W.2d 657 (N.D. 1977).
140. Mees v. Mees, 325 N.W.2d 207, 208 (N.D. 1982).
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principle why the fault of an economically dependent spouse should
be more significant than the fault of an economically dominant
spouse, some analysts do find that pattern in divorce allocations. 141
The pattern reminds one of the old notion that only virtuous wives,
during and after marriage, were entitled to be supported by their
husbands. Treating fault as having fiscal consequences may in the
past have mitigated the hardship of divorce for some alimony
recipients, 142 but since there is no logical relationship between
marital fault and entitlements to post-marital support, any such
mitigation was random and coincidental.
Since both equitable property redistribution and post-marital
support as a compensatory entitlement are mechanisms for sharing
tangible and intangible assets of the marriage, at most, fault should
be considered only to the extent that it can be shown to have
significantly
affected
economic
contributions
within the
marriage. 143 Since compensatory
maintenance is wholly
independent of the old concept of alimony as a continuation of
marital support for the virtuous wife, it might be more prudent to
wholly remove the consideration of fault that was historically
intertwined with that old concept.
Fault is completely irrelevant to entitlements to rehabilitative
maintenance. Certainly fault cannot be relevant to the minimalist
concept of rehabilitative support based upon need, as it cannot
affect the determinative fact of whether or not a former spouse
needs education or training in order to be financially self-sufficient.
Fault has no effect upon the standard of living established during
marriage or the opportunities foregone because of an economic role
within marriage; thus, fault should not be considered for
determining an appropriate level of post-marital rehabilitation
beyond minimal self-support. Irrespective of whether fault should
be treated as relevant to the sharing of assets and advantages
141. E.g., Haugeberg v. Haugeberg, 258 N.W.2d 657, 668 (N.D. 1977) (Vogel, J., dissenting).
Case law suggests that if the husband is at fault, he will get half or more of the property; if wife is at
fault, she will get little or nothing; if both are at fault, the division will be aporoximately equal or the
wife may get somewhat less than half. Cf Piper v. Piper, 239 N .W.2d 1, 4 (N.D. 1976). In Piper. the
wife urged that precedents established that, where the husband is at fault and the wife relatively
blameless, the wife must be awarded at least half the parties' net worth; the court agreed that this
might often be the result when the husband was at fault but rejected the suggestion that it was a rule.
Id.
142. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
143. E.g., Anstutz v. Anstutz, 112 Wis.2d 10,
-, 331 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983)
(court in dividing marital property may consider whether one party depleted marital assets by
squandering, neglect, or intentional destruction); Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, -,
472
N Y.S.2d 11 , 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (the wasteful dissipation of family assets by either spouse
is a factor which must be considered in fixing an award of maintenance, but economic fault is
distinguishable from marital fault).
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achieved during a marriage, it is illogical to treat it as if it could
either reduce or somehow eliminate the disadvantage imposed
upon one party by the fact of divorce or by the impact of an
economic role within a marriage. Once rehabilitative support is
understood as a means of mitigating a disadvantage rather than as
an entitlement premised upon positive contributions within a
44
marriage, the irrelevance of fault should be evident. 1
B.

DURATION

Although it is so ingrained that it may seem self-evident, the
continued assumption of most courts that the remarriage of a
recipient presumptively terminates spousal support must also be
reexamined. It is in fact remarkable that the termination of
maintenance by remarriage, a consequence linked so closely to the
concept of alimony as a continuation of marital support, should
survive rejection of that concept.
The minimalist concept of rehabilitative support is based upon
a need to remedy the incapacity of a formerly dependent spouse for
any kind of self-support. To that extent, remarriage is not
presumptively controlling because that incapacity is not
presumptively removed by remarriage. It could be argued that
remarriage removes the need for self-sufficiency because it brings
with it a new spousal duty to support. Our contemporary
understanding of marriage, however, is that it permits rather than
imposes the choice of one spouse to assume a dependent economic
role. 14 5 If a recipient of rehabilitative support does not make a good
faith effort to become economically rehabilitated, that fact should
The rule that a court should consider fault only to the extent it affected economic contributions
within the marriage would be analogous to the general rule that fault is only relevant to custody
determinations to the extent that it affects the parent-child relationship.
144. The details of the conduct in Hegge v. Hegge made it an impolitic case in which to
persuade the court to declare fault irrelevant. Hegge v. Hegge, 236 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1975). It is
important to remember, however, that the Hegge court's consideration of fault as relevant to alimony
was in a decision that predated its endorsement of the concept of rehabilitative maintenance. For a
discussion of rehabilitative maintenance, see supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Richter v. Richter, 344 So.2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). In Richter, a
concurring opinion stated as follows:
Very possibly the remarriage might accomplish the rehabilitation in that the former
wife has established herself in the occupation of housewife and receives her income and
support from that source. On the other hand, a remarriage may not demonstrate the
absolute rehabilitation of the wife. The days when women married for support have
passed and the roles of the partners to a marriage are not stereotyped but vary from
family to family. Thus for this court to determine that rehabilitation occurs or doesn't
occur upon remarriage is not grounded on reason.
Id. at 890 (Dauksch, I.,
concurring specially). In a per curiam decision, the Richter court reversed an
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occasion suspension or termination of the support .either before or
after remarriage. However, abandonment of rehabilitative goals
cannot be inferred from the circumstance of remarriage alone.
Equitable rehabilitative support seeks to repair or mitigate
career opportunities and development lost during the failed
marriage. Remarriage cannot be said to repair or mitigate those
losses. In Bauer v. Bauer,14 6 the North Dakota Supreme Court
recognized that equitable rehabilitative support can continue
beyond the recipient's remarriage. In that case, the court affirmed
Gary Bauer's obligation to pay his former wife's school expenses
for a program of higher education for a maximum of seven school
years. 147 In 1985, the appellate court approved rehabilitative
spousal support beyond remarriage of the recipient for the first time
in a case in which the award had been judicially-imposed rather
than pursuant to the parties' stipulation. 148 If a recipient of
equitable rehabilitative support achieves rehabilitation or stops
trying to obtain education or training to improve her employment
skills and earning capacity, that changed circumstance justifies
termination of maintenance. 149 As .with minimalist support,
award of lump sum rehabilitative alimony to be paid in installments regardless of the remarriage of
the recipient. See Frye v. Frye, 385 So.2d 1383, 1389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). In Frye, the court
observed that "since rehabilitative alimony is paid for a specific purpose not necessarily related to the
recipient spouse's remarriage, it would seem to follow that it should not necessarily be terminated
upon remarriage." Id. at 1389. See Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 22, at 149. The authors state that
"while some judges still consider the 'location of a new husband' as the major goal of the transitional
period, the focus is increasingly on acquiring new skills or updating old ones so that the divorcee can
become self sufficient." Id. But see Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. Legal Stud. 35 (1978)
(remarriage is an important alternative "employment" for divorced women).
146. 356 N.W.2d 897 (N.D. 1984).
147. Bauer v. Bauer, 356 N.W.2d 897, 899 (N.D. 1984). The court recognized that equitable
rehabilitative support can continue beyond remarriage; however, it reaffirmed the Nugent rule that
remarriage establishes a prima facie case of changed circumstances terminating support and reversed
the trial court's denial of the former husband's request to terminate his stipulated agreement to pay
$50 per month spousal support payments "for life." Id. at 898-99. For a discussion of the Nugent rule,
see supra note 50.
148. Bullock v. Bullock, 376 N.W.2d 30 (N.D. 1985). In earlier litigation, the trial court
awarded and the supreme court upheld an award to Patricia Bullock of permanent, compensatory
spousal support in the amount of $1,200 per month. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
After she remarried, her former husband moved to terminate spousal support. 376 N.W.2d at 31.
The trial court concluded that rehabilitative support of $800 per month for 18 months was
appropriate to cover her expenses while she became recertified to teach. Id. The supreme court
affirmed the award. Id. at 32.
149. Faircloth v. Faircloth, 449 So.2d 412, 412-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). In Faircloth, the
court stated as follows:
While Frye states that rehabilitative alimony does not automatically terminate upon
remarriage, it does not prohibit a trial judge from finding that remarriage or other
changed circumstances of he recipient spouse has eliminated or altered the need for
further rehabilitative alimony ....
The recipient spouse has remarried and obtained
employment through the family business of her new spouse. She is no longer in the
training position she had at the time of the final judgment, and she is making no
attempt to improve her job skills aside from the job at the family business. Appellant
has made no showing of her continuing need for rehabilitative alimony. Therefore, we
find that the trial court properly terminated the award of rehabilitative alimony.
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however, achievement or cessation of rehabilitative efforts cannot
be presumed by the fact of remarriage.
It is not appropriate that compensatory support automatically
terminate at the remarriage of the recipient. Since compensatory
support is premised on contributions to the marital unit in general
and in particular to the enhanced earning capacity of the
economically dominant spouse, it should at least continue until
those contributions are compensated. 15 0 North Dakota has
determined that a compensatory entitlement to be supported by
future income must be characterized as support in order to be
modifiable. It should not, however, bring the old rule that alimony
terminates at remarriage to the concept of spousal maintenance as
an entitlement based on shared contributions. Since compensatory
support recognizes an entitlement of former spouses to
proportionately share standards of living made possible by marital
capacities attained during their marriage or reductions in standards
of living caused by divorce, remarriage of the recipient may cause
changed circumstances that justify modification or termination of
spousal support. Changed circumstances should not, however, be
151
presumed from the fact of remarriage.
If a court is reluctant to award permanent spousal support, an
Id.
In holding that no material change in circumstances justified modification when the recipient's
income increased to more than the payor's because she improved her earning capacity by acquiring a
master's degree and securing a higher level of professional employment, the court rejected the
possibility that the alimony initially awarded was rehabilitative support. Lipp v. Lipp, 355 N.W.2d
817, 819 (N.D. 1984). The court seemed to doubt, however, that the payments were really spousal
support rather than part of property division. Id. at 819-20.
150. J. AREEN, supra note 31, at 636. The author states as follows:
Alimony, according to the contribution principle, should end only when the earned
share has been paid off. This could be in one lump sum at the end of the marriage if
the other spouse has sufficient assets. If not, the time payments on this "debt" (which
are what we normally call alimony) should not end because of remarriage or even
death, but only when the full "debt" is paid off.
Id. Accord Krauskopf, supra note 63, at 401. Note, however, that the North Dakota Supreme Court
concludes that an allocation not terminating at the death of the recipient is an award of property.
Sesupra note 45.
For examples of compensatory spousal support not terminating at the recipient's remarriage see
Greer v. Greer, 32 Colo. App. 196,
-, 510 P.2d 905, 907 (1973) (alimony for specific number of
years in consideration of wife's contribution); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693,
-, 264*N.W.2d
97, 98 (1978) ($15,000 alimony in gross, even though wife's current earnings are greater than
husband's, fairly represents wife's contribution to acquisition of husband's degree); Wheeler v.
Wheeler, 193 Neb. 615, -,
228 N.W.2d 594, 596 (1975) (payments for 89 months increased by
appellate court to $200 per month because wife contributed substantially to education of husband
and he was just entering period of peak earning potential); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750
(Okla. 1979) (the only means of satisfying wife's vested interest in husband's medical profession is by
$100,000 alimony); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071, 1072 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (alimony of $300
installments to continue until full amount of $39,600 is paid).
151. The North Dakota Supreme Court has rejected the argument that extraordinary
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equitably proportional sharing of income-productive capacity
achieved during a marriage can be usefully analogized to
proportional sharing of pension benefits 5 2 or to judicial responses
to claims against earning capacities enhanced by professional
degrees. 153 Comparable proportionality was achieved in Weir v.
Weir by awarding compensatory spousal support for twenty years,
following a twenty-three year marriage.1 5 4 Courts can sometimes
avoid the difficulty of qualifying durational entitlements to
compensatory maintenance by enforcing stipulated agreements to
55
continue payments during the lifetime of the recipient. 1
Moreover, now that property allocations such as pensions often are
not immediately payable, 5 6 judicial reluctance to impose
permanent support obligations might be avoided by a provision
that spousal support be reduced at the time such property

circumstances justify continuation of spousal suyport after a recipient's remarriage because the new
husband cannot support her at the standard of living established during the earlier marriage. Bauer
v. Bauer, 356 N.W.2d 897, 899 (N.D. 1984); Nugent v. Nugent, 152 NW.2d 323, 329 (N.D. 1977).
That makes it clear that there is no indefinite entitlement to an established standard of living. But see
Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904, 911 (N.D. 1984) (upholding award of support until recipient's
death because the "[trial] court could very reasonably have concluded that rehabilitation beyond
Patricia's present earning capacity was not likely in the near future") and Weir v. Weir, 374
N.W.2d 858 (N.D. 1985) (upholding spousal support for twenty years as an attempt to an equitable
sharing in the overall reduction of the parties' separate standards of living). The North Dakota
Supreme Court approved in principle possible continuation of rehabilitative support beyond
remarriage of the recipient when it affirmed the trial court finding in Bauer v. Bauer that "disparity
of education between the parties upon leaving the marriage and the documented contemplation of
the parties that this disparity be made up to [the wife]" justified continuattion of the obligation to
pay college expenses of the remarried recipient. 356 N.W.2d 897, 898-99 (N.D. 1984). The appellate
court did not agree that there were extraordinary circumstances justifying continuation of the
stipulated agreement to pay $50 per month as and for alimony for life. Id. at 899. That conclusion,
however, would not preclude arguing in an appropriate case that compensatory support should not
terminate at remarriage because the underdeveloped earning capacity of the recipient could not be or
was not yet rehabilitated and she had not been proportionately compensated for her contributions to
(teenhanced earning capacity of her former spouse.
152. See supra notes 107 and 108. See also Faus v. Faus, 319 N.,W.2d 408, 413 (Minn. 1982)
(spouse awarded as maintenance half of value of retirement benefit units earned during duration of
marriage; payments not to terminate if recipient remarried).
153. See supra note 106.
154. Weir v. Weir, 374 NW.2d 858 (N.D. 1985). See supra notes 125-127 and accompanying
text.
155. E.g., Burr v. Burr, 353 N.W.2d 644, 646 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (obligation to pay
spousal maintenance does not terminate upon recipient's remarriage when stipulation incorporated
into decree provides that payments shall terminate when recipient reaches age 62 or in the event
payor retires at age 62); Rintelman v. Rintelman, 118 Wis.2d 587,
-,
348 N.W.2d 498, 503
(1984) (former husband estopped from seeking termination of maintenance because he stipulated
that payment would continue during recipients' lifetime); Raymond v. Raymond, 447 A.2d 70, 72
(Me. 1982) (parties' express agreement that alimony continue past recipient's remarriage is an
extraordinary circumstance justifying continuance). See also Cook v. Cook, 364 N.W.2d 74, 77 n.3
(N.D. 1985). The party seeking reduction of spousal support did not argue that the recipient's
remarriage created a prima facie case requiring termination in the absence of extraordinary
circumsntances, Id. The court not I that the incorporated stipulation showed the parties' intent was
that remarriage not affect the payments: Id.
156. Seesupra notes 107-109.
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distributions are made.

157

IX. CONCLUSION
Focusing on rehabilitative and compensatory support is a
means of emphasizing that there are in fact different policies that
may make it just to award post-marital allowances. If those policies
are taken seriously, rules that developed ancillary to the old concept
of alimony as a continuation of marital support must be
reconsidered. Continued reexamination of the shape of support
obligations will encourage coherence and facilitate predictability in
judicial determinations of suitable terms and conditions for just
awards.

157. E.g., Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904, 906 (N.D. 1984) ("alimony shall cease when
[recipient] starts to receive her share of [her former husband's] retirement provided that her
share of the retirement is at least as great as the alimony payment"); Weir v. Weir, 37,4 N.W.2d 858

(N.D. 1985).

